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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The three following lectures form the second series delivered at the
University of Illinois on a foundation established in 1935 by Mrs.
George E. Frazer of Winnetka, Illinois, as a memorial to her father,
the late Edmund Janes James, President of the University from 1904
to 1920. Under the terms of the gift the lecturers are chosen by
a committee selected from the professors of political science and
economics.
The first series of lectures, published in 1938, included a "Bio-
graphical Note of President James," by Evarts B. Greene, Professor
of History at Columbia University (formerly Professor of History
and Dean of the College of Literature and Arts at the University of
Illinois), and lectures on: "The American State University: A
Problem in Political Science," by Herman G. James, President of
Ohio University; "Public Service and the University Graduate," by
Leonard D. White, Member of the United States Civil Service Com-
mission and Professor of Public Administration, University of Chi-
cago; and "The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Nation,"
by Robert E. Cushman, Professor of Government, Cornell University.
The lectures of the second series also have been given by men
distinguished for academic and scholarly ability and for practical
experience in public affairs. It is the hope of the University that
publication of these lectures will be of value to the citizens of Illinois
and other states in stimulating their interest in the problems of gov-
ernment and politics.
John A. Fairlie
Simon Litman
Iohn M. Mathews
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THE CONSTITUTION IN TRANSITION

THE CONSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 1
By Thomas Reed Powell
Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
First of all, let it be said that the Constitution always has been in
transition and always will be. Thus in my title there is a charter of
freedom and liberty, not only for the nation, but for myself as well.
The breadth of the topic gives me liberty to roam at will over several
hundred years of American constitutional history. For we have had
several hundred years of American constitutional history, and not
merely a century and a half, as our present-day sesquicentennial
celebrations might lead one carelessly to assume.
American colonial history is American constitutional history. The
independence of the colonies from each other was a constitutional fact
with significances that are of continuing moment today both in senti-
ment and in constitutional fact. The relation of the colonies to the
Mother Country was likewise a constitutional fact of far-reaching
significance, not only in the colonial period, but in the organization of
our constitutional federalism and in its progressive evolution. The
past and the present are members one of another, as are stability and
change. In the past as in the present, there is always the interaction
of stability and change.
If etymology may be our mentor, "The Constitution in Transition"
may include transition in space as well as in time. As the colonies
varied in their internal organization and in their relation to central
control in England, so did the succeeding states adopt constitutions
of different types. Separation of the executive from the legislature
was common to all, but there was divergence in the ways of choosing
the executive and in the delimitation of executive powers. Two-
chambered legislatures were predominant, but not universal. The
methods of apportioning representatives among counties, cities, and
towns were far from identical. The measure of local autonomy had
a wide range from. state to state. I well recall the shock when I first
learned that there were other ways of doing things than those sanctified
by my New England forebears.
These diversities of our seventeenth century organization have
hardly lessened with the years. Though we have had but one depar-
ture from legislative bi-cameralism and our chief executives are now all
chosen by the electorate, executive powers of appointment and of
'Delivered March 22, 1939. With the consent of the authorities at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, portions of this lecture have heen incorporated in an article in
the Boston University Lazv Review, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Nov., 1939), pages 509-532.
1 II 1
control over administrative agencies and over the legislature follow
different models. No state gives to its governor the wide powers of
executive control conferred upon the President. The time is not likely
to come when we shall have any form of national popular choice of
cabinet officers, judges, ambassadors, and members of administrative
commissions. In the states, the so-called short ballot is making head-
way, but a state voter would still find his perplexities greatly reduced
if he had to choose only a state representative, a state senator, and a
pair to serve respectively as governor and lieutenant governor. The
state voter in his state field would find no parallel in the disappoint-
ment of the Princeton professor who announced that he was going to
vote for Governor Thomas Marshall for Vice-president but not for
Governor Woodrow Wilson for President.
The striking contrasts between state and national types of gov-
ernment caused me some perplexity when as a prerequisite to teaching
in the summer school of the University of Washington at Seattle, I
had to take an oath that I would by precept and example promote
respect for the flag and the institutions of the State of Washington.
Had this been all, I might have got along for six weeks by promoting
respect for the initiative, the referendum, the recall, and the popular
election of judges for short terms, provided that upon my return to
Massachusetts I could lawfully promote respect for her institutions,
because she refrained from any of these democratic procedures. The
difficulty was, however, that the State of Washington required me to
promote respect for the institutions of the United States concurrently
with promoting respect for her local departures from our national
model. I had to promote respect for the judicial system of the United
States, in which the judges are appointed by the executive and hold
office during good behavior, and at the same time promote respect for
the judicial system of the State of Washington, in which even good
behavior cannot save the judges from the judgment of the electorate
at frequent intervals.
To the diversities already suggested we must add the many more
that we find in the kaleidoscope of local governments. About a dozen
states have some constitutionally secured municipal home rule, and it
takes a second edition of a very fat book to portray the resulting
vagaries. I wonder whether Mr. Fairlie's students of municipal gov-
ernment still have to have at their finger tips all the permutations and
combinations of city charters that we had to struggle with in our
preparation for examinations. Single chambers and double chambers,
mayor and council, election by wards and election at large, proportional
representation by plumping or by single transferable vote, commission
government and city manager, city and county separate and city and
county combined, tax limitation, debt limitation, this type of budget and
that type of budget, appointments by the mayor or elections by the
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council, park boards and school boards and library boards and police
commissions, some chosen one way and some another, with powers
and tenure arranged in an astronomical number of different ways
—
such were the things poor students once had to master, trying to
remember which city had which on the date of the latest edition of the
textbook, and what changes had since taken place.
In this sesquicentennial triennium, when we rightly devote so much
attention to the Framers and their great achievement, we must bid our-
selves remember that not all government is yet centered in Washing-
ton, however much the orators and headliners may strive to excite our
alarm. When we think of state government, we must remember that
it is not all centered at the state Capitol. I do not know how many
towns and cities and counties and districts and boards of various sorts
there are in the United States, but I know that there are more than
fortv-nine. In numbers alone, the forty-eight state governments and
one national government are infinitesimal compared with local gov-
ernments. From the standpoint of direct participation in framing
governmental policy, town and city and county government must
enlist the services of many more citizens than do the nation and the
states. In numbers of minor officials and employees, in expenditures
and in extent of activities the sum total of local government is stu-
pendous. We should not minimize its far-reaching importance and
significance because it has no single focal point. Many a mickle
makes a muckle.
I suggest the magnitude only to emphasize the multitude of the
diversities of governmental forms and mechanisms prevailing in the
United States as we observe constitutional transition from bailiwick
to bailiwick. Where our written constitutions have not constrained
choice, we have been prolific in experimentalism. So far as mere forms
of government are concerned, one could hardly complain of a statute
resembling the infamous Lusk Laws of New York, provided one
remained free to advocate all forms of government that might be
found somewhere in the United States. We may not have anywhere a
parliamentary system closely modeled on that of Great Britain, but
our city managers must retain the confidence of an elected body and
there are forms of the recall which somewhat resemble the recall of a
Prime Minister by an adverse vote in Parliament. When the Prime
Minister falls, it is often due, less to a change in the opinion of his
party supporters in Parliament than to a change in the climate of opin-
ion in the country at large. Presidents who remain secure in their place
may not remain secure in their power. Nevertheless it would be a
strain to contend that we have shown much hospitality toward the
most characteristic feature of the government which has developed
from the government from which we successfully rebelled.
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We might, if we chose, go a long way toward subordinating the
President to some organized cabal in Congress. With the power of
the purse and the Senatorial power to withhold confirmation of presi-
dential nominees, there are clubs to make a President submissive if
the legislative possessors choose to wield them. The only time when
these clubs have been extensively exercised was the most disgraceful
season of American political history. In my youth I assumed that
Charles Sumner and Thad Stevens were noble giants battling for the
right. I discovered the contrary when I grew to maturity and changed
my residence from a Republican stronghold run by an old-soldier
oligarchy. The Congressional heroes of the Reconstruction era had
their powerful day but they do not shine in glory now. Yet there
might conceivably arise some worthier occasions for the exertion of
Congressional power and such power might be directed more wisely
than it was against Andrew Johnson. The only point I am making is
that the constitutional articles of partnership between the President
and the two houses of Congress leave so much to the play of political
forces that with respect to this partnership the Constitution has been
in transition in the past and may at any time be in transition again.
This possibility of transition finds ready illustration in the con-
temporary quarrel over so-called Senatorial courtesy. The Constitution
leaves the Senators wholly free, if they wish, to consent unquestion-
ingly to the appointment of a present or past Senator to any other
office. It leaves the Senators wholly free, if they wish, to defer abso-
lutely to the preference of a single Senator from the state of which
any nominee is a resident. If the Senators choose habitually to accord
deference to such Senator, then, as Mr. Howard Lee McBain put it,
the Living Constitution is that the Senator has a power to nominate
and the President a power to confirm. I see no reason to call it usurpa-
tion if the Senators choose to accord such deference. Though the
constitutional power of Senatorial advice and consent applies to the
ultimate appointment and not to the prefatory nomination, this does
not negative a power to refuse to consent if the President in making
the nomination has disregarded extra-constitutional prior Senatorial
advice. The whole matter is left to political practice. We may talk
about wisdom and unwisdom, but we have no right to talk about
constitutionality and unconstitutionality.
As to wisdom, it is to me quite clear that it is unwise to pervert
power over judicial appointments into a mere tool for the building of
political fences, whether by the President or by a Senator or group of
Senators. Apparently in the recent situation in Virginia, the crucial
issue was a disagreement as to which of two fences should profit from
the leverage of the appointment. One might quote two well-known
men and say, "A plague on both your houses." A political scolding
for a political refusal to confirm would come better with respect to a
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nomination untainted by political considerations. Yet the cross-
scoldings of the quarrel may serve a useful purpose if they stimulate
public opinion to oppose perpetuation of any notion that judicial ap-
pointments are the perquisites of Senators. The past evils of such a
notion have been due, not to Senatorial failures to confirm, but to
Presidential fears of such failures in the absence of Presidential
acquiescence in the recommendation of the Senator. Senators have
demanded judicial appointments as their perquisites and have secured
them when the President, if unfettered, not only could but in many
instances would have made much better appointments. Of one instance
I know from the most trustworthy source. Reports of other instances
are frequent, with good ground to trust their accuracy.
I am not talking about Collectors of the Port, District Attorneys,
Collectors of Internal Revenue, or United States Marshals. I am
talking about federal judges who hold office for life. If a Senator
promotes the appointment of a particular person to such a judgeship
in hope of future favors in return, he is seeking a judge who will
be swerved from his duty in order to pay a political debt. Receiver-
ships are fat things, and their fatness should not be political fat. A
judge should be unfettered in appointing receivers, in supervising their
work, and in fixing their fees. He should be under no suspicion of
using his office to pay for getting it. If he is under a debt to an in-
dividual Senator or to a party organization of which that Senator is
a leader or a follower, the possibility of suspicion must always be
present. Though in fact the Senator may have picked his man solely
as a reward for past services without thought of future favors, the
case is hardly better. Past political activity is neither an essential nor
a particularly appropriate qualification for able and disinterested
judicial service. Ties of mere gratitude may still prove to be fetters
or at least will be suspected of being such.
One who attends conventions of state bar associations is quite
likely to hear mention of this or that lawyer who is highly commended
as a most appropriate person for a vacant federal judgeship, but who
is said to have no chance because of lack of the right political backing.
The backing thus lacking is that of the Senator and the relevant political
organization. No one knows how many superior persons have been
passed over in favor of inferior ones because it was known or assumed
to be useless to urge upon the Attorney General and the President a
man who did not enjoy the preference of the Senator who might
invoke Senatorial courtesy to prevent confirmation. No one knows
how many times the Attorney General and the President have yielded
to Senatorial suggestions of mediocrities because of reluctance to face
a fight over confirmation. Every informed person, however, knows
that both have happened more frequently than is to be desired. The
case is no better if the President takes the lead in treating a judgeship
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as patronage for a Senator or as patronage for a faction more disposed
toward the President and his policies than is the Senator. The ap-
pointees may turn out to be able and independent judges, but the
system can hardly be said to be a contributing factor toward any such
happy result.
The best way for a President to free himself of the shackles of
Senatorial courtesy in filling vacancies on the federal bench would be
to refrain from political tactics himself and to make nominations of
such undoubted excellence that individual Senators would either wish
to claim credit therefor or be discouraged from instituting opposition.
If judgeships became prizes for outstanding merit, with no intrusion
of any requisite of political qualifications, more men of outstanding
merit would make the financial sacrifice involved in surrendering the
rewards of practice for the relatively small judicial salary. Not-
withstanding one strikingly unhappy exception now under public notice,
there has for so long been a record of such distinction in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that men of high
ability have welcomed opportunities to sit on that court and on the
courts that are vestibules to it. Vacancies on the federal courts arise
with sufficient infrequency to enable the Attorney General and the
President to canvass fully all worthy suggestions for filling them.
With general knowledge that the highest possible merit was to be
sought for, merits could be widely canvassed before the actual occur-
rence of the vacancy. Without the slightest doubt, constitutional
customs long prevailing could be modified materially with greatly
improved results.
Most of the recent discussion of the controversy between the
President and Senators Glass and Byrd has been conducted in terms
of constitutional law. So far as constitutional law is concerned, I see
no room for debate. If a majority of the Senators wish to defer to
the views of two Senators and withhold consent to a proposed Presi-
dential appointment, they have a complete constitutional power and
right to do so. It does not follow that they are wise in doing so. It
does not follow that we should not strive to establish a constitutional
custom that would induce them to refrain from doing so wherever
the President is as free from playing politics as he may desire them to
be. The evil, as I have noted, is not in the occasional Senatorial nega-
tives that attract public attention. It is in numerous positives that may
seldom come clearly into view. Special considerations apply to the
judiciary because of function and tenure that do not apply to other
officers. In this recent controversy as in so many others, it is a mistake
to think in terms of constitutional power when the genuine issues are
ones of statesmanlike policy and constitutional wisdom.
Because of our written Constitution and its interpretation by the
judiciary, we are inclined to overemphasize that part of constitutional
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power that can be passed upon in authoritative judicial decisions.
Because the words of the Constitution are so seldom added to or
subtracted from, we are apt to forget how much actual constitutional
change can take place within the words or wholly outside of them.
The Constitution as a document knows nothing of national political
parties with national conventions to promulgate a platform and nom-
inate candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. It knows
nothing of a national campaign for the presidency in which the national
candidates debate vastly more about legislative policies than they do
about executive appointments and other strictly executive acts. The
Constitution assumed something very different. It assumed a small
selected group of men, chosen as state legislatures should direct, who
should deliberate independently on the best man for the presidency.
Yet the Constitution left room for the development that has come
about. We could reverse that development if we wished. One consti-
tutional transition could be succeeded by another.
Presidential leadership in legislative policy has developed naturally
from the fact that the candidate for president, if we omit his coadjutor,
is the only national candidate that appeals to a national electorate.
Senators and representatives think primarily of their states and their
"deestricts." The tariff as a whole may not be a local issue, but the
tariff on steel or wool or hides or shoes may be a bundle of varying
local issues. There are silver states, and cotton states, and wheat
states, and manufacturing states. There are preponderantly farm dis-
tricts and preponderantly manufacturing districts. The national plat-
form seeks to catch them all, and the party candidate for president
must be mindful not to please too few of them. When the candidate
for president seems to be catching the favor of the voters, the candi-
dates for senator and representatives who are of his party hail him as
chief and promise to follow in his train, with such reservations as
peculiar local conditions may seem to make advisable. If you give due
thought to what takes place in presidential campaigns, you will see why
the party leader who becomes president is bound to assume the role of
legislative leader. You cannot ask him to be chief proposer and
promiser in campaigns and then to refrain from seeking to translate
promise into performance.
Though we put upon the President the responsibility of legislative
leadership, we do not leave his leadership unfettered. It is not usur-
pation for the President to seek to lead ; but it is also not usurpation
for the Congress to refuse to follow. When Congressmen complain of
being mere rubber stamps, they are usually complaining that a majority
of them find reasons for thinking it better to follow presidential leader-
ship. The docility of Congress varies greatly from time to time. The
honeymoon period seldom lasts eight years. It is not a matter of pride
that temporary docility is not unrelated to patronage, but patronage
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is not the only instigator of Congressional concurrence. Senators and
Representatives are likely to have ears well attuned to the ground, and
they will not long follow a leader who has lost his following in the
country. The President's position as legislative leader is continually
in transition. The actual powers of his office change from year to
year, perhaps from month to month, certainly from proposal to pro-
posal. And this in a vital sense is the Constitution in transition,
though the shiftings are not nominated in the bond.
There are, of course, issues as to the relation between the national
executive and the national legislature that give rise to litigation and to
the ultimate pronouncement of the Supreme Court. The Court has
told us in recent years whether the Senate may reconsider the confirma-
tion of a Presidential nominee, whether the President may sign bills
more than ten days after the adjournment of Congress, whether the
President's power of removal is constitutionally safeguarded or sub-
ject to legislative restriction. On this latter question, the Court has
told us different things at different times. In a case involving merely a
postmaster, Mr. Chief Justice Taft went quite out of his way to assure
us that the President must be as free to remove members of high
administrative commissions as to remove postmasters. When there
came before his successors the case of a member of the Federal Trade
Commission, the prior dictum was rejected. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
had been President. His successor as Chief Justice had not been,
though he had come near it. The Constitution itself drew no distinction
between postmasters and members of the Federal Trade Commission.
The distinction which the Supreme Court drew in the second case,
after denying any distinction in the first case, was a sensible enough
distinction, but the transition from the first case to the second does
not establish that the relation between the executive and legislative
departments is an immutable one even with respect to matters subject
to judicial control.
While it is established by way of generality that none of the three
departments of government may encroach upon a field that is the
exclusive province of one of the others, the boundaries of possible
exclusive provinces are in many respects by no means clearly defined.
In the words of Judge Bynum of North Carolina in 1874: "While it
is true that 'the executive, legislative, and supreme judicial powers of
the government ought to be forever separate and distinct,' it is also
true that the science of government is a practical one; therefore, while
each should firmly maintain the essential powers belonging to it, it
cannot be forgotten that the three co-ordinate parts constitute one
brotherhood, whose common trust requires a mutual toleration of the
occupancy of what seems to be a 'common because of vicinage,'
bordering the domains of each." The generalities apply automatically
only in the clearest cases, where dispute is unlikely. Beyond this, there
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is the ever-present difficulty of drawing the line. In special situations
legislatures and administrative officials may do things that generally
only courts may do. In foreign relations and in control of the army
and navy, the President has a wider immunity from legislative dicta-
tion and restraint than he has in some other exercises of executive
authority. Yet Congressional control of foreign commerce can affect
international relations most decisively, and the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy must get from Congress an army and navy to
command. The clear blacks and whites are much less frequent than
the many intervening shades of gray. We do well not to talk in abso-
lutes. From function to function and from field to field there is con-
stitutional transition with respect to the specific application of the
general canon of separation of powers.
If we are to maintain the essentials of our tri-partite system of
government, it is clear that no department should be completely super-
seded by another. Each must retain a realm in which it is free from
dictation or constraint. Such freedom of choice on the part of each
may of course block the wheels of government if the different depart-
ments persist in remaining at odds. With a mulish President, a mulish
judiciary, and a mulish Congress we would of necessity have a balky
governmental team. This to a degree is what the system of checks and
balances was designed to make possible. Those who insist that that
government is best that governs least should have no complaint. Yet
few are such complete anarchists as to push this slogan to its extreme.
Those who resent what they call governmental interference with
business have not resented a protective tariff against the products that
compete with theirs. They have welcomed governmental protection of
their property and their transactions and governmental promotion of
their interests. They are more anarchistic in their talk than in their
political activity. A complete and permanent deadlock between the
three departments of government could hardly be pleasing to any one
but a thug. What our Framers must have wished is not a permanent
deadlock but sufficient independence of the departments so that there
must be an accommodation between them to arrive at concurrence.
Neither alone should have its way unfettered. There must be give and
take and co-operation.
The co-operation of two or more departments is a very different
thing from the encroachment of one department on another or the
supersession of one department by another. When the legislature
delegates power to executive or administrative authorities, there is no
encroachment on legislative authority or supersession thereof. There
is no encroachment on judicial authority so long as the judiciary still
has its say when administrative action comes before it for review. If
the judiciary holds that findings of facts by administrative authorities,
when supported by substantial evidence, are to be accepted as final, it
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gives no more weight to administrative findings than to the findings of
untrained and perhaps unlettered jurors. Even juries have been known
to make mistakes, as many a disappointed litigant will bear witness.
All administrative power must have legislative sanction behind it. If
the legislation is not explicit, it is because the legislature preferred to
give latitude in filling in a blank check or in filling the interstices in
a check with open spaces. Political pressure on the legislature may be
directed against extending latitude to administrative authorities as
well as against specific prescriptions under consideration by the legis-
lature. Political pressure may be directed against the legislature to
revoke wide powers given to executive or administrative authorities.
Executive and administrative authorities exercising power delegated by
the legislature are not masters of the legislature. They are its servants
and agents.
The major cry against administrative authorities is a cry against
government, against the only kind of government that in many
instances can be effective government. In so far as it is a complaint
against the particular policies the administrative commission is vested
with power to enforce, complaint should be directed against the legis-
lative policy and not against the commission. Those who complain
against the National Labor Relations Board are not so apt to complain
against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. They prefer loans to
banks and insurance companies and railroads to restraint on employer
interference with collective association of employees. Congress has
chosen both, and has chosen to put the execution of both in the hands
of administrative agencies. Judicial review of the orders of the
N.L.R.B. is both legally and practically much more feasible than judi-
cial review of the lending of the R.F.C. The Labor Board is without
power to enforce its orders. The R.F.C. makes its loan, and if it turns
out that a horse has been stolen the barn door is not shut until after-
wards. Whether the policy behind the Labor Relations Act or the
Reconstruction Finance Act is a good policy or a bad policy, is not my
concern. I am talking about governmental mechanisms for executing
legislative policy. The enforcement of the policy underlying the Labor
Relations Act requires the co-operation of three departments of gov-
ernment. The Act and its execution interferes with the independence
of no department of government. Adverse criticism has no just occa-
sion to speak of encroachment or usurpation. From the standpoint of
the three departments of government, what we have is co-operation
between them.
There remains always the question of the procedure by which ad-
ministrative commissions reach their conclusions. The work of such
commissions is sometimes legislative in character and effect and some-
times judicial. Both are subject to censure and condemnation by the
courts. It would be hard to say that in exercising this function the
{20}
courts have been lax. Not infrequently they have seemed to deny to
commissions the power they regard as sacred when exercised by juries.
They have certainly rendered rate regulation much more cumbersome
and ineffective than able Supreme Court dissenters have thought wise.
They, like the lay critics of administrative power, have too often di-
rected against the commission some complaints that are really founded
on aversion to the substantive policy of the legislation. Nevertheless,
issues of procedure are vital issues and it is well to have them em-
phasized. Men may disagree about what is a fair day in court, a fair
trial, a fair procedure, but men should not disagree that the ideal
of fairness should be zealously cherished. A procedure requisite for
one kind of administrative action may not be requisite for another.
There can be constitutional transition to and from the procedures for
dealing with rates or labor relations or public lands, or security issues
or old-age pensions or workmen's compensation, or admission or de-
portation of aliens, but the procedure must be fairly adapted to the
fair execution of the particular governmental function, or we may be
recreant to cherished canons of our polity that in these days more
than ever need to be held aloft before a tragically misguided world.
While the validity of executive action under authority delegated by
the legislature has been the subject of judicial pronouncements from
the beginning of government under the Constitution, the inauguration
and growth of subordinate administrative agencies is comparatively
recent. It is perhaps not strange that courts have been inclined to view
them with suspicion—a suspicion born, it may be, in part from con-
sciousness of rivalry. It may not be pleasant to discover that other
agencies may perform certain tasks better than we can. Many judges
have in fact had the same suspicion of legislatures. Statutes that
change the common law have often been interpreted narrowly by judges
to confine the change as much as possible. Many judges have been
prone to think of themselves as exercising a priestly function, revealing
to the uninitiated the mysteries of a common law that derives from
some almost supernatural reason untainted by the will and frailties of
mere lay mortals. This may explain why judges have so often deceived
themselves when they have set their judgment against that of other
departments of government, but have denied that they as human beings
played any part in the process. It may explain why judges in declaring
legislation unconstitutional have so often insisted that it is not they
that speak but the Constitution that speaketh in them.
Events of recent years have made it unnecessary any longer to
contend that the voice of the Supreme Court is not wholly an imper-
sonal one. We all know that it makes a difference whether the majority
on the bench is composed of men with one attitude or of men with
another. It should not, however, have been necessary for any discern-
ing person to postpone this perception until the recent past. Marshall
{21 }
has long been praised for so shaping the Constitution that we became
a nation and not a loose congeries of states. Contrasts between Mar-
shall and Taney have had their place in the school histories. The
initiated know that in the early years of the Fourteenth Amendment
the majority Justices of the Supreme Court led by Mr. Justice Miller
were opposed to the broad censorship over state legislation advocated
by the minority group led by Mr. Justice Field. Slowly the changes
in the composition of the Court brought Mr. Justice Field into the
ascendancy. The earlier tolerance toward state legislation was suc-
ceeded by increasing readiness to apply canons of laissez faire as tests
of constitutionality under the vague if not meaningless contours of the
phrase "due process of law." From year to year the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was in transition away from the judicial conceptions first domi-
nant in its interpretation.
Of late the transition has been in the opposite direction. Ten hour
laws and minimum wage laws that once denied due process do so no
longer. The sacred right of the employer to dismiss men for union
activities and to require them to pledge themselves in advance not to
become or remain members of a union is now a right no longer. In
the latter years of the Taft court, recurrent majorities overruled old
cases and invented new doctrines to condemn state taxation that had
long historic sanction. In federal taxation there was the same striving
to emasculate tax statutes and aid taxpayers in devices to avoid tax-
ation. With the advent of the Hughes court, the tendency came to a
halt. Some former cases of the Taft era were now overruled, and
novel points were decided in ways that the earlier majorities would
condemn. The changes can be measured by noting how frequently
those who used to be in the majority were now usually in the minority.
At the very last term of court, Justices McReynolds and Butler dis-
sented together in 22 cases in which not one of their colleagues joined
them. It was not thus before 1930. Then the dissenters most com-
monly grouped together were Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone.
With the passing of the years, a change has come.
Of course it is not only the years that have passed. Men have passed
also. A significant change came in 1930 when Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
and Mr. Justice Roberts succeeded Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Mr.
Justice Sanford. This change put Justices VanDevanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Butler together in dissent with increasing frequency.
Some new decisions involved square reversals of former decisions.
Other new decisions were decisions that would not have been antici-
pated earlier. The quartette that so long had executed fours right
dissented together in the cases sustaining the regulation of milk,
mortgages, and gold. The tables were turned when they carried Mr.
Justice Roberts with them to condemn the Railroad Retirement Act,
the New York minimum-wage law, the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, the
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Coal Conservation Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Only
in the latter instance did the Chief Justice join them. As went Mr.
Justice Roberts, so went the most important cases. The situation re-
sembled that of an earlier era when Mr. Chief Justice White and
Justices VanDevanter and McReynolds canceled Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, and Clarke, and the decision depended upon which side could
get two of Justices McKenna, Day, and Pitney. There was constitu-
tional transition from case to case, as there has been constitutional
transition from era to era.
A new era is now with us. How long it will last, no one knows.
I recall that an eager friend of mine saw in the Nebbia Case, which
sustained New York's fixing of minimum prices for milk, a firm
assurance that the old obscurantist views of the Supreme Court had
been forever relegated to the past. He thought me foolish when I
prophesied that the Court would shift in the future as it had shifted in
the past. Then came the minimum-wage and railroad pension cases,
and for the new future he foresaw darkness rather than light. Later
the light dawned for him again. Yet it was a light that could hardly
have been anticipated at the time. Before the President's court pro-
posal, it would have been a rash man who would have prophesied that
we should see the Court sustaining the Social Security Acts, the
Wagner Labor Relations Act, the new Municipal Bankruptcy Act,
and the new Frazier-Lemke Act. When the majority apply the Wagner
Act to manufacturing corporations much less preponderantly concerned
with interstate commerce than was the Carter Coal Company, the
minority beg the majority to tell them whether the Carter Case which
condemned the Guffey Act is still law. The majority do not answer.
There has been more differentiating than overruling. Hence in the
Supreme Court reports there are cases that slant to the left and cases
that slant to the right, cases to the right that at the moment are not
followed but that may in the future again become guiding lights if later
Supreme Court majorities should prefer their beacons to those that
at the moment direct the judicial course.
These most recent changes in judicial attitude may, for all their
diversity, be put under the general rubric of a new tolerance toward
legislative experimentation. For such tolerance to have play, there
must be the legislative experimentation to tolerate. It would not be
unconstitutional to repeal all the laws that the Supreme Court has
sustained. The Supreme Court is not putting a temporary legislative
policy into the Constitution as a command merely because it fails to
find in the Constitution a prohibition. One who says that the Court is
really controlling the future because it will be impossible to secure
legislative repeal of many of the laws that the Court sustains is merely
saying either that the laws are certain to continue to enjoy preponder-
ant popular favor or that the supposed democratic processes of our
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system are not adequate to secure expression of the popular will.
Those who most criticise a court for not safeguarding their interests
against legislative interference are often the ones most likely to be
fearful that the democratic process is in fact well adapted to secure
expression of the popular will. They are apt to be the ones who in
secret or in public insist that what we most need in government is an
efficient way of curbing what they may call the mob. For their comfort,
it can be said that we still have barriers against precipitate majority
rule. Yet it still remains true that legislatures are sensitive to the
views of voters and that a policy that will not work or will not prove
sufficiently pleasing is not immune from abandonment or modification.
To some it is confusing that the judges who on the whole prove
most tolerant toward legislative experimentation are the ones most
ready to condemn the legislatures or inferior courts when by proscrip-
tion or by procedure they act to curb those freedoms that we put under
the general head of civil liberties. The same apparent paradox ap-
pears on the other side of the divided bench. It is Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds and Mr. Justice Butler who have less zeal for civil liberties
than for judicial curbing of governmental regulation of business. Yet
on both sides the paradox is more apparent than real. There may be
no chance for legislative experimentation if those who hold unpopular
views are curbed in the expression of them or are subjected to other
restraints because of the views that they hold. Moreover, freedom of
speech and of religion and of the press have an explicitness of protec-
tion in the First Amendment that no particular economic policy can
claim from the indefiniteness of the words "due process of law," or
even of "obligation of contracts." If the Fourteenth Amendment is
as vague as the Fifth, it still remains true that constitutional canons
of liberty, wherever expressed, must get sharper contours and rein-
forced sanction from clauses where they are expressed most definitely.
If history means anything, the Fourteenth Amendment finds its best
fulfillment when it is a shield against oppression of lowly persons.
And above all, if current events teach anything, they teach that sup-
pression of thought and of utterance and of political expression is a
menace that threatens what is most vital in the civilization which we
have striven to beget, to nourish, and to preserve.
And so, though in time and in place, we have a Constitution that
always has been in transition and always will be, though new forms
succeed to old and new policies to old, there are essentials which
must always be preserved. It took us generations to admit to the elec-
torate all who have a stake in our common life, but now we have done
so, and the free expression of the electorate is a cornerstone of our
polity. The popular will may be something of a myth, but popular re-
sponse is not a myth. So long as our chosen officials know that they
must face the issue of an untrammeled popular response to their
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governing and an untrammeled popular choice between them and those
who are proposed in their stead, we have a safeguard against ab-
solutism and oppression that other peoples now so sadly lack. We may
not like the direction toward which our temporary officials may strive
to turn our ways, but we must like the fact that we can say so most
vehemently, bad as it may be for the blood pressure, and that at stated
seasons we can turn the rascals out. We must safeguard the right of
others to talk as vehemently as we, provided they refrain from inciting
other means of change than those we leave open to them and those
which alone we ask for ourselves. We must continue to be ready
to accept defeat, as we always have been, except perhaps once when
the passions of fratricidal strife had not yet cooled. As we have
always espoused democracy, we must not complain if democracy comes.
Even by those of us who are now most favored, the changes which the
full fruition of democracy might bring should be preferred to what
our state would be if democracy were overthrown.
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THE COMPROMISE PRINCIPLE IN POLITICS 1
By T. V. Smith
Illinois Congressman-at-Large
In a Colorado graveyard
Two men lie in one grave.
They shot it out in a jam over who ozvned
One corner lot: over a piece of real estate
They shot it out: it was a perfect duel.
Each cleansed the -world of the other.
Each horizontal in an identical grave
Had his bones cleaned by the same maggots.
They sleep nozv as tzuo accommodating neighbors.
—Carl Sandburg
Then—
/ shall have to bate my price,
For in the grave, they say,
Is neither knowledge nor device
Nor thirteen pence a day.
—A. E. Housman
Colleagues of the University of Illinois, Junior and Senior:
A sense of guilt incident to the practice of compromise is perhaps
the worst inner enemy of the democratic way of life. Suspicion that the
practice is absolutely necessary alone renders tolerable to many the
sense of guilt accompanying. To make the practice of compromise
completely fruitful, as well as merely tolerable, would require to find
embedded in it a principle above the merely expedient, though the ex-
pedient is not itself, without a hearing, to be deprecated as a respectable
form of the moral ideal. Scrupulous inquiry as to whether there is
a superior principle operative in compromise is to pay democratic
theory the compliment of a profound query. If we find at the heart
of compromise an ideal higher than utility, we honor it with an obser-
vation. Either way, we have the fun of inquiry for our pay—and re-
tirement into solitude or malcontency if we too much mislike the
accommodations required for urbane living.
I
Whatever you may estimate the outcome of this inquiry, it is highly
appropriate that we make the appraisal of compromise upon such a
Foundation as this, a foundation happily bequeathed by filial piety in
honor of a distinguished president of this University. To be president
of any university is to practice the politics of compromise, covert
'Delivered March 14, 1940.
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politics at least—and at a state university the practice is more overt
than covert. Upon the record itself, President Edmund J. James was
a successful, I may even say a great, president. Under his long admin-
istration here, the University of Illinois shook off its awkward clothes
of adolescence and stepped forth fully clothed for maturity. Under him
the faculty morale was good, and relations with the legislature were
excellent. Those two factors spell successful compromise in University
politics.
Happy is the University with such a past salted away to make
savory any future days of leanness. Fortunate the University whose
president leaves descendants as percipient as this Foundation attests
of President James. His daughter's splendid gift for, and his son's
distinguished contribution to, this lectureship meet tonight and mingle
in memory to deepen my own appreciation of this occasion. As I read
President Herman James initial lecture upon this Foundation, entitled
"The American State University: A Problem in Political Science,"
my mind went back to my first contact with this remarkable James
family. It was in the halcyon undergraduate days at the University
of Texas, where I first met Herman, now himself President of Ohio
University at Athens. He was my early teacher in political science,
later respected colleague in Texas, and now for many years my
beloved friend-at-large.
Is there some magic in the name James? There have been at least
three remarkable families of that name in America. There was the
family of Henry and William James, belonging to New England and
the nation. There was the bandit family of Frank and Jesse James,
distant kinsmen of mine, belonging to the Southwest and the nation.
And there is latest but not least the family of Helen and Herman
James, belonging to Illinois and the nation.
Happy is the state which has had the services of such a father
and retains the loyalty of such a son and daughter. Fortunate is the
University of Illinois in receiving and perpetuating such a foundation
as this. To the fifth fruitage in print of this lectureship let us now
turn.
II
I have been assuming that compromise has at least the justification
of necessity in political life, and even the same in educational adminis-
tration. Have I proceeded too rapidly? Must what has been assumed,
now be proved? If one hold the ideal alone to be required of men and
then insist that compromise contradicts the ideal, he might by a suc-
cession of motivated syllogisms prove that truly good men do not have
to make compromises at all. Just such an argument has been paraded
on religious grounds in behalf, say, of pacifism. To be religious, one
hears at times, means just this: that one will never be put in the po-
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sition of having to choose between evils. It may be so. I cannot speak
too confidently of how the saints must face reality in order to preserve
their sanity. But of sinners I know a thing or two, and of democrats
even more. I know that democrats (I mean people intent upon living
together without condescension)—democrats face a necessity that
renders many a compromise relatively virtuous. Since necessity is the
beginning or end of all argument, let me now illustrate and evaluate the
types of necessity here involved.
Are we troubled at hearing lovers quarreling and parting? Then
look to the lives of those who do not part, whether they quarrel or not.
Above the level of "you-and-I-am-one-and-I-is-de-one" harmony, the
lasting marriage moves along the path of successive reactions toned
down to the tune of mutual concessions. Such give-and-take seems to
require a minimum of "give" only to those habituated to the maximum
"take." If men think that modern marriage does not require com-
promises that hurt, it is because men live in a society where wholesale
concessions are sanctioned by custom before masculine bookkeeping
begins. And if women think the same, let them correct their impres-
sions by the tremendous price in peace, prestige, and ambition more and
more- men are willing to pay for that misty mirage named divorce.
Compromises are necessary in marriage, but the very necessity renders
them tolerable.
Are we troubled at the strife that goes on in every community,
rising in spirals from neighborly askances, through gossip, to litigation?
Then let us celebrate in art and otherwise the patience, the reticence,
the sagacity, and the downright magnanimity that prevent our falling
on each others necks with axes. Paul Laurence Dunbar, the Negro
poet, has deliciously written:
There is a heaven, for ever, day by day,
The upward longing of my soul doth tell me so.
There is a hell, I'm quite as sure; for pray,
If there were not, zvhere would my neighbors go?
Yes, compromises between neighbors are necessary, but the very neces-
sity renders them tolerable.
Are we troubled at the class conflicts of our more and more im-
personal world? Then let us know and honor the work of intermedi-
aries that professionalize the task of composing human differences.
The lawyers make a living at it from of old. Labor conciliators are
building a new career for men possessed of both strategy and good will.
And the oldest profession next one—I mean politics—engages its
practitioners now as ever, and ever, and ever, at the task of mediating
the conflicts of life that outrun in stridency the mellowing influence
between lovers, between friends, and between neighbors, all of whom
may still soften malevolence through meetings face-to-face.
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These latter forms of enmity flow down from hills so old as to have
developed ruts that make life together possible with or without com-
pletely satisfactory techniques of adjustment. Compromises go on at
each of these levels, of course; but man's old infelicities would hardly
merit an academic lecture from a congressman-at-large if these were
not intensified, each and all intensified, by the strange new social dis-
tance which the division of labor has produced, imbedded, and imbodied
in what we call modern industrial society. How much of sociality
survives this division of labor—and at what price, we must now inquire.
Let us observe at the start the drain upon human nature imposed by
the specialization required in the acquisition of any and every particular
skill. 1 To subdue fancy from freedom to concentration of attention is
to achieve a disciplined mind ; but the cost of the discipline is reflected
in the fact that a man who is good for severely technical thought is
often good for little else. He loses luster as he narrows himself to the
rut required for efficiency. It is a tremendous price that man pays for
the privilege of being specialized. If it be costly to the individual, it is
also costly to (though not without precious compensation for) society,
as we mean to show.
Its cost to both alike is a species of dismemberment: "we murder
to dissect." When man who is "born for the universe narrows his
mind" and for any one thing gives up all the reaches of imagination,
he becomes less than he might be, but in order to become something
more than he might otherwise have been. It is this double-dealing
involved in civilization which lays so heavy a weight of woe upon
modern men. We must give up freedom, as it were, in order to become
free men, sacrifice the juices of life for the leanness of a livelihood.
If we follow fugitive impulse, however, we shall remain the slaves of
nature as well as accidental victims of one another's ranging. If we
subdue to too-rigorous discipline the heart's desires, we invite reaction
against the aridity of efficiency and motivate this reaction with griev-
ances and aggressions stored up against the social order which houses
our efforts.
That the division of labor has today become oppressively minute
needs no proof. It is hardly too much to say that the average industrial
worker must now make his living (if he makes one) at a job which
does not at the same time yield him the essentials of a life. That is the
direst spiritual tragedy which can befall a man, to toil at labor so
minute and mechanical as not to be self-rewarding. No shortening of
hours, no addition of leisure can wholly compensate for work which
itself is belittling. To provide such compensation as is possible is a
major requirement of industrial statesmanship today, but what is pos-
sible in this regard is not enough. We observe the fact in order to
'I have borrowed here several paragraphs from my collaboration with
Leonard D. White, Politics and Public Service. Harpers, New York, 1939.
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remark the problem which democratic peoples face in daily competition
with totalitarian countries, where on the surface the morale of citizens
may seem superior.
The problem is further intensified by the same virus on the level of
mental work. Here, too, the labor has been divided into ever and ever
more restricted spheres. Here specialization has eventuated as profes-
sionalization with subspecializations inside each profession to further
segment earlier solidarity. There are doctors who can hardly speak
intelligently with other doctors for lack of common knowledge, and
this in spite of what purports to be common training. This is appar-
ently true of every profession. Pride achieves particularistic prestige
;
it feeds itself upon further details honored by more technicalities until
at last the sea of sympathy once charted by a common profession is
drained off into any number of inland lakes defying intercommunica-
tion save at the price of heavy portage.
If this be true inside the same profession—and it appears true of
every profession today—how much further is the separation and more
onerous the portage between the several professions as such. One who
supposes that all problems are solved with the solution of his own
should observe a legislature, where the problems mostly arise from one
solution meeting another solution. The teachers solve at last, as in
Chicago, the problems that long kept them apart in warring groups.
Then, united and unionized, they meet the Board of Education which,
united though not unionized, was up to that point "sitting pretty." The
legislature has its peace disturbed by the problem that arises from the
meeting of two groups each unified but against the other. Or the
teachers meet the taxpayers' associations ; and the legislature is busy
for months, trying to reconcile claims that arise at the edge of well-
functioning organizations. Consider also the not-too-civil relations
between learned professions themselves: preachers and lawyers, or
lawyers and doctors, or engineers and teachers, or even of doctors
allopathic and doctors homeopathic, not to mention osteopaths and
chiropractors ! By narrowing the gaps between persons and sub-groups
within the professions, the gulf between the professions themselves is
not infrequently widened and deepened. Problems arise from the
solution of problems. And these newly required solutions long delayed
breed group repressions and aggressions to swell greatly the individual
aggressions from repressions naturally inherent in every social form.
The professions themselves represent on the negative side, there-
fore, an influence deeply antisocial when viewed from the standpoint
of the Great Society. Their very great glories and unquestioned
services arise from, illustrate, and even intensify the psychic distance
which constitutes the major problem of industrial society. As first fruit
of this distance we have as substitutes for the class struggle of Marx-
ism any number of group antagonisms, each heightened by failure to
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understand across the social distance of special vocabularies and the
blindness of technicians toward whatever lies beyond their own sharp-
edged competence.
As illustrated thus by even the favored professions, our society
breaks up into a few happy men in a context all the more seamed by
the very conditions of their happiness. "Moral man" but, as Niebhur
picturesquely puts it, in an "immoral Society." We shall summarize
the matter less picturesquely. With manual work turned by the division
of labor into frequent individual frustration, and mental work left
self-fulfilling to fortunate ones but frustrative also of social unity, we
face the peculiar fact that our means of industrial grace are in a larger
sense the work of the devil. When our very efforts at goodness turn
into badness before our eyes, we are put at a disadvantage before our
competitors, particularly before the communists with their emphasis
upon comradeship and their confident prediction of a classless society.
We say communists advisedly. But let us note first that all the
totalitarians have, to an extent alike, heightened the morale of citizens,
and especially of youth, by promising to restore, or claiming to have
restored, some idyllic solidarity. Through historical appeal the fascists
have actually begotten a sense of unity with centuries gone and
through clever propaganda have induced a continuity of present effort
and of glory for the future. Imperial unity made seductive through
promised grandeur borrows obverse significance, it is true, from the
sight of castor oil on the Italian handy shelf and from vague fear of
what else but. The happiness of the nation as a whole is paid for
terrifically by the misery of domestic dissenters and by the insecurity
generated beyond the borders. But, conspicuous as the negative side
is to us, we do well not to underplay the strength of the positive side.
We can see this same strength also in the work of the Nazis. True,
their negation is stronger also. By finding a prepared scapegoat in the
Jews, and also in other minority groups, they have concealed from
themselves, as they have revealed to more humane peoples, the horrible
debits of their drive for "Volk" unity. "Be my brother," thunders the
voice of Thor in a German proverb, "or I will bash your head in."
Still, their affirmation of Nordic unity upon the ancient estate of a com-
mon and superior blood has an appeal that is deeply satisfying to such
as can do the bashing and to such others as can hug illusion as wise
men love the truth. The myth of a gregarious "Volk" resurrects the
musical tramp, tramp, of primeval inter-participation and cures the
lesions of the industrial epoch with the surcease of a paradise no less
grand because very dimly visioned. This dimly visioned afterworld
and the too vividly remembered foreworld of dissatisfied sophistication
and of guilt from war failure combine to focus their weird glows into a
present mirage of national grandeur. Parties are past ; freedom is ful-
filled ; action impends ; and German blood is sanctified as the holy
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ghost of gregarious glory. Outer order becomes the framework of an
inner unity that is mystic and mighty.
But the communists, as we have already suggested, carry to its
logical limit both the negative and the positive aspect of the sanction of
unity. The stronger the purges, the stronger the alibis, until at length
the rationalization of holy violence becomes impregnable to any sus-
picion of self-odium. Any dissidence is "wrecking," and paradise-
betrayers are simply too wretched to be accorded any right save access
to the gallows. For here is the benediction of that "comradeship"
which nestles down to restore faith in the dream that has lured every
utopia-builder since time began. The common use of so holy a saluta-
tion—"Comrade !"—is a stroke of ironic genius if not, indeed, a plain
dispensation of Plutonian grace. For at a time when saintliness has
veered to the secular, the subdual of cold citizenship to warm com-
radeship is a magnificent presumption of strength in weakness.
With the simplification of all aggressions to a single struggle be-
tween only two classes goes also the dearer simplification of many
"may-be's" into one mighty "must-be"—Marxian inevitability of out-
come. Though God forget, the processes of nature roll on their ruth-
less way to a felicity that's foregone, guaranteed "to come to pass
whether it ever happens or not." Whoever has gazed with St. Marx
into the crystal ball of dialectical materialism can see there, plain as
day, a classless society arising just precisely out of the shell of a State
that has miraculously withered away, as wonderfully as honey flowed
from the carcass of the devitalized lion on pious postcards of our
Sunday-school days. It's a real comfort to know, indeed to foreknow,
that no efforts of the faithful will prove vain if the faithful but dedi-
cate their energy to a catharsis of all that is divisive and to the creation
of all that is comradely.
Seeing clearly the psychological disadvantage of our sober realism
to their extravagant romanticism, let us take frank stock of ourselves
and our assets. Forewarned, we can forearm. Nor let us underestimate
the disadvantage of our failure to match these European myths of
unity. Frankly and finally, we are not in a position to compete with
either set of fanatics on the sheer grounds of conscious mythmaking,
even if we had the will to do it. We paralyze our will to perform such
wonders by calling the promises thereof lying. Moreover, we cannot
keep our minds on the myths of classlessness or even of folkiness for
shuddering at the blood which drips from old-world pretenses of having
solved thus the problem created by division of labor.
But what have we to offer as the solution of that problem in lieu of
their magnificent myths? 1 Well, we have the art of compromise as
practiced primarily by the politician. For it is precisely the indicated
*A few paragraphs follow, slightly changed, from my The Promise of
American Politics. University of Chicago Press, 1936.
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outcome of these intergroup conflicts that the democratic politician
exists to shield us from. If such compromise is our alternative, is
indeed the only alternative to myths implemented by purges, then it
would pay us to afford as favorable a view as possible of both our
principle of compromise and the persons who carry that principle. Any
honest fanatic can see that this is the crucial alternative if he but press
himself to answer this question: "What happens to community peace
if I meet a fanatic on the opposite side as honest and unyielding as
I ?" Not every fanatic can entertain this question. Only a very honest
fanatic will ask it of himself and press for an answer. If he answers
himself that there is no equally honest person on the opposite side,
he is not only a fanatic ; he is also an ass. You may bray back at an
ass, but you do not try to argue with him, not even with the front end.
The vices of our practicing politicians we must compare not with
the virtues projected from the consciences of secluded individuals but
with the vices of fanatics who have become dictators. In this context
more beautiful things than one might think could be said of our poli-
ticians—by way of compensation, if not by way of extenuation, for
whatever vices attend upon the arduous process of saving us from
violence and murder. People elsewhere get killed in the conflicts of
interest over which our politicians preside with vices short of crimes
and with virtues not wholly unakin to magnanimity. If in this process
of accommodation, politicians sometimes lie, it is regrettable but better
than dictatorship. If they sometimes truckle, it is despicable but better
than dictatorship. If they are sometimes bribed, it is execrable but
better than dictatorship.
Whoever has seen great legislative battles with interests clashing,
pressure groups pressing, lobbyists lobbying, and then has seen emerge
through the slow, fumbling, and inefficient process called compromise
such an adjudication of the issues as gets accepted by all—whoever
has seen this has seen a process gracious in comparison with what is
felt, even when not seen afar, in the alternative methods of a Mussolini
or a Hitler or a Stalin as they settle issues by taking the easy way with
dissenters.
Ill
When all this is said, however, we have hardly more than got around
to the point of re-stating our problem against alternative failures to
solve this problem inherent in society itself and intensified in all indus-
trial societies by specialization. For when animosities become such as
to require professional mediators and these must buck general suspicion
in efforts to soften conflicts, hope of perfect solution should not run
too high.
The attitude of the average high-minded American citizen toward
his politician is certainly a case in point. It reflects itself not merely in
the citizen's withdrawal from politics as from something dirty. It
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reflects itself also in attributions invidious to him who does volunteer
for political service. Exceptions but prove the rule, as the politician
knows from hearing his own praise chronically coupled with dispraise
of his political fellows to whom he knows himself not substantially
superior. Let us not deny that shoddiness can be found among poli-
ticians to document the citizen's distrust. But it is not probable that
the generalized feeling can be adequately explained by any objective
quality, nor therefore that the distrust could be made to cease by any
change in the personnel of politics. My suspicion is that citizens must
change more than politicians before this happy day of mutual trust
comes round. For my conviction is that politicians are victims of gen-
eralized aggressions deflected from the nagging self-guilt of idealistic
citizens.
Not only is the conviction so. But one can actually observe the
deflection itself rebounding to intensify the self-guilt that originally
produced it. Is it not a common experience for the best citizens, in their
better moods, to feel a little guilty at their own depreciation of the
politician? We all sense, what the fact really is, that we cannot get
along democratically without the political representative, since he is
the custodian of our common business, business all the more compel-
lingly common when we disagree as to what we have in common. But
thus to intensify self-guilt is hardly to allay it. So great is the demo-
cratic need to allay this malevolence toward our moral middle-men,
political carriers as they are of our private consciences, that we should
look shrewdly at the etiology of this particular form of self-guilt, the
form felt by good men, I mean, as regards their relation to politics
and politicians.
The simple truth is that we Americans are heirs not only of this
political tradition of compromise, but heirs also of a tradition older
than it, and speciously more precious. The moral tradition counsels us
to have high ideals and to live up to them. It is bad enough that we
fail to do so in numerous details. Bad that is, but tolerable ; for at the
best ideals remain constant to renew their lure toward perfection, and
at the worst they serve as standards to remind us that aspiration still
has a mission to perform. Much worse, therefore, than this piecemeal
failure to fulfill our highest ideals, is disunion in our ideals themselves.
To have two sets of ideals that always diverge a little and not infre-
quently almost contradict—that is something serious in the life of the
earnest man and woman. So serious is it indeed that a heroic remedy
is often sought for it.
As between the claims of morality and the demands of politics,
many a good citizen has longed, with the older saint, for some deliver-
ance from the body of this death. Politically motivated, as most of us
are on Monday, Wednesday and Friday; and morally motivated, as
most of us are on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, no wonder that
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Sunday has been felt required to reunite into one these two divisions
of the self. But so deep has this conflict become between what we
would do but do not, and what we would not do but do, that Sunday is
not long enough, and for many not holy enough, to join together what
the week has dissevered. This feeling of personal disunion is often
worse in a democratic society than in a monarchic or any form of
authoritarian one. There one can obey orders without the responsibility
that attaches to giving them. In a democracy where every man is king
and sovereign, whatever divisions there are, are carried closer to the
soul.
Better as democracy is, then, in some senses, it does impose a
heavier moral load upon its citizens than does any other form of gov-
ernment. More in need than others of religious relief from moral
burdens, citizens of a democracy have more woes and get less relief.
They have more woes for reasons already given. They get less inner
relief because the religion they have inherited is mostly borrowed from
societies whose citizens were not responsible as democratic citizens are.
Acquiescence is poor, even perturbing, advice to those who must act,
but do not know which line to take. There is a piety social and a piety
solitary. One tradition encourages us to measure up to our ideals even
if we have to live alone and like it. The other tradition would shame
us into the magnanimity of "going along," as the political word always
has it. Religion that is relevant to this division is itself divided in
counsel: on the one side it is "the social gospel" hardly distinguish-
able from the democratic way of life ; on the other side it is "what one
does with his solitariness" closely identified with "keeping oneself
unspotted from the world." No, Sunday, I repeat, is hardly long
enough a day, and for many not holy enough a day, to cure the dis-
union of a soul torn between political compromise and the unequivocal
conscience.
IV
Why, then, not give up compromising and return to the unequivocal
conscience? But that is to accept dictatorship. To avoid dictatorship
somebody must do compromising. It is a necessity for the democratic
life, not to say for any form of social life. Then, let the politician do it.
He knows that game. What did we elect him for, anyway? All right,
then, let the politician do the compromising. But stay!—do it wholly
without us, or partly with us? If wholly without us, then he has
become our ruler and representative government is dead. A fairly
heavy price, that, to pay for peace of mind; so heavy a price in fact
that peace itself is paid for peace of mind. Page Germany, and ask
Niemoller ! Page Mexico or Hades—and ask Trotsky ! Page Chicago
and ask Borgese ! Then let the Politician make the compromises for its.
In that event we really are making the compromises through him, as
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democracy implies ; and all our responsibility is back upon us, full
tide. There's no way around compromise, Sir, no way save dictator-
ship ; and that's no way either. We must go through compromise, and
if through it, then bravely not fearfully through it. There are some
evils that are dissipated, all evils are lessened, by simple understanding.
While I do not suggest that the equivocality attached to the practice of
compromise is that simple, I do say that we have everything to gain
from an honest analysis of this democratic practice. Perhaps we shall
find hidden in the act a principle that even the stoutest conscience will
recognize.
One principle, indeed, is worn upon the sleeve of every compromise,
the principle of expediency. If we distinguish social from individual
expediency and if we then substitute a long run for the short run view
of the matter, already we are on our way to a principle of action the
dignity of which is belied by that tone of voice—"mere expediency!"
But I mean to avoid every suspicion of a short cut in this matter. To
avoid even the suspicion of evil here is to refuse the aid, to begin with
at least, of one of the great schools of ethics, the Epicurean and in
later days the Utilitarian.
There is in democratic compromise a principle operative whose
outer aspect alone is expediency. Its inner aspect is something pure
to every aspiring soul. And that inner aspect is nothing other than the
sacred thing called growth. We start life unseeing ; we open our eyes
as we go along; and in the end, if fortune favor, we behold our world
wide-eyed in wisdom, knowing not only this and that but something
also of good and evil. How is this progression started, how maintained,
how culminated?
Take food. We start with the lukewarm, and it only in liquid form.
This preference for the bland is strong and resists enlargement. The
sours repel, the salts irritate, and the colds annoy. The adult gamut oi
piping hot coffee and teeth-chattering ice cream is an achievement in
gustatory growth every step of which has been resisted by somebody
and many a step by everybody. Is it better to have a range or merely
a unitary taste? And is that "better," mere expediency? Variety here
is not only better in its consequences; it's better in its very being.
Tolerance in taste is an elemental ingredient of democratic compromise,
and that we mean to show.
Take a humble skill like typewriting. One starts upon the lowly
process of learning to type by touch with no organized resources at
all for doing it and no purpose higher than the utilitarian. The machine
itself has no holding power stronger than idle and easily satisfied
curiosity about it. Attention is fugitive and easily divided. The keys
are recalcitrant to fingers, and fingers are stiff when called upon to
deliver the fruitage of print.
Then supervene the tedious, toilsome hours of practice, in which
{39}
attention slowly gets harnessed through disciplined fingers to keys. To
make a long and sure story short, the day arrives in which mastery
passes from the typewriter to the writer of the type. A machine has
been broken in through manual mastery to serve the rapid processes of
the mind. Fingers are alert, eyes are free to follow the lines of copy
or in glad creative abandon to roam the foothills of thought or to seek
surcease from fatigue in climbing the happy highlands of fancy.
The same joy that children feel in the pure precipitation of laryn-
geal liquidity is now sublimated through nimbly flying fingers as it
pours into print. And as one cans pure fresh talk, he may be musing
to himself all the while 1 :
"Half the fun of life is in flowing freely at the mouth, the other
half in flowing even more freely through the Angers. It may be but a
bubble at the tea table, rising to a babble before the liquored bar, and
striding to a bickering before the enrobed bench. It may rise to a
nobler gushing from the rostrum and the stump. It may become an
avalanche of foam and fury in the presence of hardly suffered wrong.
In whatever form the flowing flows, the heart is eased of fulness so
that it may enjoy itself to fulness once again, and back again.
"Newspapers are but talk still sticky with ink ; magazines, talk
where the ink has dried ; books, talk canned in decorous code and pre-
served against hours of solitude and silence. Our meditative musing is
but free-wheeling talk, and our most cogent thinking, talk rehearsed in
private against the happy hour when the stage or typewriter will once
more be ours. Talk is full telltale of our simian ancestry, chattering
among the trees ; talk is full commemorative of our human heritage,
sharing sense through sound ; talk is faintly predictive of our fairest
clairvoyance, in some romance-grounded after-gloaming of perfect
understanding. Meantime, they live fullest who talk best. And as for
service, they also serve who only sit and clatter."
An agency of utility has grown through the lowly discipline of
learning to type by touch into an organ of joyful self-expression. A
beloved object, though but a machine, has risen from a sea of percep-
tual indifference ; and mind and muscle, now married through its min-
istry, have conspired together to reach a new dimension of communi-
cability. Character has evolved from the amorphous to the amalgamated
in finding something to do in the doing of which there is mastery and
joy. It is all humble enough—a fingered thing of cold technology; but
one is never the same after having acquired this skill ; and what has
happened on the inside is more important than anything, that because
of the skill, is likely to happen outside.
The acquisition of such skill is an elemental ingredient not un-
connected with democratic compromise, and that we mean to show.
*I have borrowed here a few paragraphs from my collaboration with Leonard
D. White, Politics and Public Service.
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Take a man of the world. He is all things to all men, without ever
ceasing to be himself. He meets the lowly without making them feel
their humility. He meets the proud without making it his business to
belittle their preferences. He meets the gentle with gentility to match
;
and he meets the truculent without giving them occasion to bustle or
without himself giving an inch of ground to arrogance. Such charac-
ter is not developed in a day, nor is its value exhausted in cultivating
others as a paying policy. Such a man has learned how to meet men
halfway; and, from the vantage point of halfway, to see all the way
into their characters. This is the disposition that can arrange things
among men and as between men and himself. It is the resilient spirit.
The development of such a temper is a thing organic to demo-
cratic compromise, and that too we mean to show.
One and all, these and more than these exemplify the fact of
growth. In food, from one to many ; in typewriting, from insensitivity
to a mastery that quickens a thousand things beyond itself ; in sophis-
tication, an understanding that forbears and enjoys what is forborne.
Growth it is, growth in many forms ; but ever growth, the encompassing
of the many without deserting the home base of the one. If excellence
means the harmony and utilization of one's capacities—and what better
could it mean?—then we are here describing a thing that far from
being mere expediency is also the very process through which principle
perfects itself in practice. In short we have here the rarest of all
principles, the principle of growth; and, as applied to the total man,
the principle of self-realization.
But so far we have been describing the process from the leeward
side of the self. Socially speaking the process is much the same. We
start in life with many dislikes, and not a few with trigger releases.
We fasten almost accidentally onto a face, or tone of voice, or gait
;
and we don't like that fellow. With little enough excuse, such fugitive
dislikes deepen into animosities. The Spaniard who upon the first
meeting tried to assassinate his king, was questioned as to his moti-
vation. Charles Lamb, who reports the story, says that the would-be
assassin admitted, under questioning, that he could find nothing in the
king's face or feature justly to blame; he could not convict, or even
accuse him of any evil
—
yet, notwithstanding, hated him like the devil.
Now a life motivated by aggressions, having few friends and many
enemies, does not need argument to be branded inferior ; it is self-
branded. It is small by any and every test that we know, from the
monetary to the moral. It is a life that wastes human resources, and
most of all its own. The opposite type of life is large, and roomy, and
good. It is good by every test that we know, from aesthetics to ethics.
To get along with men means to be accommodating. The roots of
amiability, no less than of animosity, are within us all. They await
watering. But under proper conditions they do grow and flower into
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the friendliness of a self-respect that respects others as a part of the
very same. Such a man is a cell in democracy; and democracy as an
institution both depends upon and creates such men. This is, as
Walt Whitman had it, "the base and finale too" of all democratic
metaphysics:
The dear love of man for his comrade—the attraction
of friend to friend,
Of the well married husband and zvife, of children
and parents,
Of city for city, and land for land.
More strain is involved in learning to like people widely than in
raising appetite from the bland to the variegated. More discipline is
required to learn to play upon the stops of our fellow men than to
clatter the keys of the typewriter. And even the man of the world,
accomplished as he is, has often far to go to become the genuinely
magnanimous man. But all of these are steps on the pilgrim's path
from relative insignificance to moral worth. Only by entertaining in
our own proper person the points of view and by respecting the in-
terests of others, do we, negatively speaking, escape dogmatism and
fanaticism ; and only so do we, positively speaking, come to the realiza-
tion and maturation of our powers. As we come to enjoy various
foods, so also it is not too ideal to think of men and women learning
to enjoy what at first they suspect and only hardly tolerate, namely the
infinite variety of ideas and actions that go to make up this gallant
human show. When we reach this denouement, we are plainly and
simply wiser and better than we were before, and wiser and better
than those who rest at dogmatism in thought and rise only to fanati-
cism in action. That is the inner lining, silvery as the glow of a sunset
cloud, of what in human relations we have called the compromise
principle.
In saying all this we have not sought to deny an outer aspect more
rude, nor sought to disassociate it from the expedient. The outer
aspect of compromise is simply this: it is highly expedient for us
to make with others whatever arrangements are necessary to give us
—
and if possible them also—room in which to grow. If we do not meet
men halfway, as is required by democratic theory, then they will at
times meet us far over on our half of the terrain. It was this outer,
the expedient, need of compromise which led Thomas Hobbes to
rationalize primordial accommodation into a lasting arrangement for
authoritarianism. And there is clearly a sociology of fear, as there is
of friendliness. If the expedient were alone, it were justification
enough for compromise. But it is far from standing alone.
Here indeed, as so often elsewhere, the expedient is for the sake
of the intrinsic. We have found, we may now say, imbedded in com-
promise both a highly expedient principle and a principle also justified
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by that which makes us act expediently, the deepest demand of our
moral nature.
We have here, then, in the principle which conditions democracy,
something dynamic enough to condition also an inner self of high
integrity. Compromises cannot be made effectively save by men who
have the accommodating spirit. Each must be able to envisage the
other's attitudes. Apprehension leads to comprehension, and compre-
hension makes possible the compromises of which we have been speak-
ing. A man who makes such adjustments understandingly can meet
the other man's views without actually giving up his own ; for his
"own," dynamically regarded, includes the accommodation which he
is of a will to make out of sympathy, out of expediency, out of aspira-
tion to be bigger and better than he is in his given narrow self.
What we have been saying does not mean, however, that some com-
promises may not be bad. It does mean that any course of action
reached by voluntary concession has this much of good in it: it em-
bodies sociality to whatever end the agreement may be made. Since
we normally assume that men act in the light of what at least they
think their interests are, any compromise arrangement is better than
autocracy where one gets all his way; the other man in our case gets
part of what he regards his good, and the one gets the enlargement
that comes from substituting for the initial view of his interest an
imaginative participation in the other person's view as his very own.
The one may get less goods for his pains, but he has more of goodness
for the attitude.
Moreover, men must often choose between evils. Every compro-
mise arrangement is an evil (with what element of good we have in-
dicated), but it may represent the least of the evils open to option.
This does not mean, however, that some compromises are not better
than others. Since the readiest evil that compromise avoids is coercion.
that compromise is better than another which most fully guarantees
more and better compromises as its own fruition. To guarantee per-
petuity to any principle better than coercion is a consummation de-
voutly to be wished in days like these. Munich was bad—we may say
with the easy wisdom of retrospect—because it made other compro-
mises necessary that all together abolished compromise and substituted
coercion in Czechoslovakia, and later a war to get back to the compro-
mise principle aborted at Munich.
I do not know that this is the best way to formulate the criterion
to show some compromises better than others. Yet it is clear that
the way we make some, determines both whether we can make others
and of what kind the others can be. Such a matter is better resolved
as near to the ground as possible, so that we may not get lost in
abstractions.
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V
Fortunately, we Illinoisans do not have ever to go away from home
to get the best of illustrations of most principles that are importantly
political. For Illinois had Lincoln ; it had Douglas ; and it forced the
two to knock their heads together for the clarification of many an
issue. In their debates, and elsewhere, these men have given us ample
illustration of both the easy and the more excellent way to compromise.
Slavery was an issue that totalized most other animosities and ran
deeper than the division of labor, though it was intensified by that
issue. Even from the Constitution itself, but especially from 1820,
slavery necessitated more crucial compromises than any other issue in
American life. Lincoln and Douglas were both participants in the
democratic process of accommodation, and both had compromises of
their own to propose as the best public policy. Neither's compromise
was wholly bad, for each wished to avoid war and both hoped for the
final extinction of slavery. No compromise proved able to forfend
war. But all this does not mean that one of their proposals was not
very much better than the other. This we mean to show, and we hope
to glean from the analysis how Lincoln's was better and why.
Lincoln and Douglas had a constitutional quarrel and, beyond that,
a material difference. They quarreled as to what the Constitution
should be as well as to what it was. Douglas argued in Ohio in 1859
that "the Fathers understood this question just as well, and even better,
than we do now." Lincoln took up this refrain in his famous Cooper
Union address (i860), gloried to admit it true; and then proceeded to
show that the Fathers' understanding of slavery favored his compro-
mise rather than that of Douglas. But apart from this constitutional
quarrel, in which each, as always, tried to make his interpretation of
the Constitution the veritable Constitution itself, they had a material
difference. It will pay us to concentrate upon this rather than upon
their jousting over the document. Eventually, as Lincoln said at Cooper
Institute, we must come to questions of right and wrong. So why not
initially?
It has been thought by idealists, who confuse our living legend of
him with the man Lincoln, that Illinois' most famous son was above
compromise. Of course such was not the case. Lincoln was a poli-
tician, we may be grateful, with capacity to grow and with reverence
for the process of growth. Like every politician, Lincoln was engaged
in the lowly art of compromise. But like other politicians, Lincoln
strategically denied upon occasion what he was doing. There is a car-
rying power to the unequivocal conscience which makes it expedient
for politicians often to seem more certain than they actually are about
the right and the wrong. In his Cooper Institute speech, for instance,
Lincoln pleaded with those already of like mind with himself: "Let us
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be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we
are so industrially plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping
for some middle ground between the right and the wrong."
In no sense would he be one, not he
—
"to unsay what Washington
said and undo what Washington did." If Washington didn't cut down
a cherry tree with a hatchet, Lincoln wouldn't with an axe. But no
politician will be deceived by such claims, least of all by such claims
from a politician like Lincoln, whose major achievement during four
years in the Illinois legislature was to bargain the state capital from
where it was to his own district ! Lincoln both preached and practiced
this maxim: "Important principles may and must be flexible." The
very paragraph indeed from which I have quoted his refusal to have
traffic with those who obfuscate the line between right and wrong,
begins with this sentence of opposite import: "Wrong as we think
slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that
much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the
nation." Before Lincoln was able to shake the genuinely unequivocal
moralists, i.e., the abolitionists, off his back, he knew who was the
lily-white devotee of unqualified right, and it wasn't Abraham Lincoln.
Not Lincoln, as may be seen from these scorching words on Lincoln
taken from the twenty-eighth annual report of the executive committee
of the American Anti-Slavery Society: "A sort of bland, respectable
middle-man, between a very modest Right and the most arrogant and
exacting Wrong; a convenient hook whereon to hang appeals at once
to a moderate anti-slavery feeling and to a timid conservatism prac-
tically pro-slavery, halfway assertions of human rights, and whole-
way concessions to a wicked prejudice against dark-colored manhood,
arguments against slavery extension, and apologies for the continued
complicity in slave-holding .... in short, if we rightly understand
him, [he] regards impartial justice as a most excellent thing, but as
somewhat too fine and costly for everyday wear."
Not to Lincoln's discredit, as you now know, but to keep the record
clear, do I record the simple fact, that as touching slavery Abraham
Lincoln was indeed a compromiser, no less so than his enemy, Stephen
A. Douglas. But he had the better compromise, which is a difference
not to be overlooked.
Their compromises differed in a way which we can easily make
plain, and cause to appear important as it was. Given an old evil and
a new territory free of it, Douglas proposed to divide the new territory
so as formally—even if he hoped not actually—to leave part of it
open to the extension of the evil. Given the old evil and the new ter-
ritory, Lincoln proposed to leave the evil of slavery alone where it was
but to save the new from its corruption. As regards the old, they were
agreed: it was evil but could not be got rid of by overt action short of
the greater evil of war.
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This acceptance of evil by both was compromise with the bad smell.
But compromise in the bad sense is often inevitable in things social.
Lincoln was hardest hit by this inevitable evil. His abolitionist friends
pressed down upon his saddened brow this crown of thorns: You
admit slavery is evil
;
yet you refuse to try to right a practice which
you admit to be wrong. Lincoln would not promise what he should not,
lest he be called to perform what he could not. Cogent as abolitionist
indictment was, and bitter as the invective that followed it, Lincoln
knew that he was not God, and continued, until war broke out, to
defend with fortitude an evil that he hated but knew not how to end.
But he had experience of evil in many forms and knew how to accept
the inevitable with a kind of natural piety that would shame most
philosophers who give that thorny plant so nice a name. That much,
he said, he "owed to necessity." "I hold it to be the paramount duty of
us in the free states due to the Union of the States, and perhaps to
liberty itself (paradox though it may seem) to let slavery of the other
states alone ; while on the other hand, I hold it to be equally clear that
we should never knowingly lend ourselves, directly or indirectly, to
prevent that slavery from dying a natural death."
This saying marks well enough the double faith upon which Lincoln
depended to recommend his compromise on slavery as more rational
than that offered by Douglas: he trusted, that is, the new, if guarded,
to grow better than it was ; and the old, if let alone, to grow less bad
than it was. His was a strategy of both forbearance and intervention,
the one soft-boiled, the other hard-boiled. He merely hoped, that is,
that to tolerate evil would terminate it in the old, but he was determined
to prevent evil in the new by positive federal action. What he regarded
the historic matter he would compromise ; what he regarded the moral
matter he would improve. The moral he conceived in terms of growth,
and the growing point of the Union he determined to keep from
contamination with the old and evil. It was with reference to this that
Lincoln gave birth to the immortal declaration at Cooper Union: "Let
us have faith that right makes might and in that faith let us to the
end dare to do our duty as we understand it."
Lincoln's overt difference here from Douglas is great but is not
of the kind it seems to some. Douglas, too, disliked the corruption of
the new and growing by the old and evil, but he did not propose
federally to implement his dislike. It is not always remembered that
Douglas thought slavery would not spread to Northern territory
because it could not. He had learned this too easy doctrine from Web-
ster and Clay. The Missouri Compromise was really motivated by the
doctrine, as was the compromise of 1850. I refer to the notion that
the domain of slavery was fixed by soil and climate—a so-called "law
of nature" which Webster declared "the foundation of all." Lincoln
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trusted providence to see to the death of slavery in the South ; but
Douglas made two trusts grow to Lincoln's one ; he trusted the God
of soil and climate to keep slavery out of the territories as well as to
doom it to eventual death in the South. This was one trust too many.
It is when men know not what to trust that they trust they know not
what.
The difference between Illinois' two greatest sons is, then, not a
difference on abolition. Both refused abolition, and Lincoln joined
Douglas up to the very War in demanding that even the fugitive slave
laws be enforced. It was not, as we have just seen, even a difference
as to whether the territories should be free of slavery. Douglas in-
sisted that he was as much against the extension of slavery as was
Lincoln. The difference was simply this: whose responsibility is it
to see that an evil tolerated in the old shall not poison the new? Douglas
trusted God with the responsibility ; Lincoln trusted men. I do not say
that Lincoln mistrusted Providence, or that Douglas distrusted men.
It's not the negative, but the positive that marks the difference. Lincoln,
always a growing man, prized growth so dearly that he thought him-
self responsible for its preservation and direction. Douglas trusted
inaction ; Lincoln the efficacy of federal effort.
And here we are back on ground which earlier we trod. Our ex-
ample of fruitful compromise has brought us back to the principle
already discovered, the principle of growth. If men are not to be
responsible for growth, for what can they be fruitfully responsible?
The old is ever full of evils, which mostly we can do nothing about
save tolerate. The past is done for ; it's dead and irrevocable. The
future alone belongs to man. The good man will safeguard and im-
prove it, for it is within our power. Lincoln did not argue with some
that because he could do so little, he'd do nothing save to let Providence
provide. Nor could he go with the easy-going in the belief that if we
work with the forces of nature, they'll do all the work. Since men
can do so little, Lincoln argued, they should do all they can.
How great the difference between these two attitudes ! If Douglas'
compromise had failed (I mean if God had not kept the Negroes out
of Northern climate and from Northern soil, which, looking at Illinois
now, I dare say God wouldn't), then others, and they the weakest,
would have had to pay the freight for Douglas' faith. It was a com-
promise risked upon the fruits of human lethargy. It promised peace
for the moment, like Munich ; but it was not such a compromise as laid
the basis for continuing accommodations at successively higher levels
until slavery should become extinct. Since Lincoln had to concede
slavery to the South, he proposed such a compromise as would save
what was left for democratic accommodation at ever higher and higher
levels. Since the only chance to make the best out of the worst was
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to save growth for improvement, Lincoln insisted that while he'd
compromise many things, he would not compromise the purely potential
with the actual evil.
Though his insistence occasioned, even if it did not cause, the war.
war is not the worst of human evils. Moreover, there's no adequate
ground to have expected continuous peace from Douglas' course. If
war will come without a compromise and if compromises cannot be
arranged without the continuous threat of war to render them invidi-
ous, then war for some minimum right may save a semblance of right
as basis for more reasonable men to continue this process of give-and-
take which we call democracy. Such the Civil War with all its horrors
proved to be. The slaves were emancipated, as a military measure ; but
they were not freed. Men must free themselves, or forever go without
freedom. But between slavery and freedom, emancipation was again
a compromise, and a compromise in the direction of growth. Lincoln
started to save the growing nation from an old evil, and he ended,
through the involuntary aid of those who would not compromise with
him upon the dynamic, by beginning the process of freeing the old as
well as saving the new from the poison of serfdom.
We have discovered operative in ourselves, and illustrated now
from Lincoln, a principle of social action that counsels us to work for
more and better compromises! When the compromise principle fails
us. all principle fails us. Principle gone, prowess alone remains. Prow-
ess will be pushed by the wise in such fashion as to return social
practice to the compromise principle as soon as possible and as fully
as may be. For domination, when necessary, exists for the sake of
accommodation, but accommodation exists in substantial part for the
sake of its own excellence.
VI
As at the beginning we celebrated the James family, so now at the
end let us celebrate the larger university family of which this James
Foundation is so fine a part. As a colleague in the intellectual enter-
prise and as a former state legislator, I have a peculiar pride in the
University of Illinois. It is a shining example of what the democratic
state can do to inculcate in men and women as citizens the accommoda-
tive spirit, to the elucidation of which this lecture has been devoted.
Looking of late' at its career-line, from the mount of solicitous
aspiration, I beheld a University named after this great state accepting
its responsibility to budge our citizenry toward the light of learning. I
beheld it continuously re-devoted to the vision with which it began as a
great people's laboratory to discover new truth and to exemplify it
as a way of life. I beheld it under energetic and sympathetic leadership
plunge upon that radical belief that all men are entitled to the educa-
tional best and that all can profit from the higher learning be its
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ministration only touched with the light of imagination. I beheld it a
medium that accepted silver from the legislature and transmuted it into
brightest gold for the larger community. I beheld its reputation outrun
the confines of the state until as from foreign parts intellectual tribute
came back from equals, so from the vast territory around came up
from all citizens the homage of their hearts. I beheld it accepted as
what was common and indispensable to all interests, however conflict-
ing, assured thus of perpetuity whatever class conflagrations may be
a-brewing in the cauldron of change.
I beheld it as the sign that humanized knowledge, instead of super-
stition, was at last, at last to prevail ; as the symbol that the heart and
the head of humanity could come to terms, as the means whereby fear
could be supplanted by confidence and conflict by cooperation. I beheld
it, in short, as the radiant embodiment of all that memory and imagina-
tion, that love and hope, that faith and work have made, may make, of
this our University of Illinois.
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I
In these days when China is being regarded as a partner and ally fight-
ing on the side of the democracies, it is natural that political scientists
and students of comparative government should ask some such ques-
tions: Is China a democracy? Has Chinese republicanism or Chinese
democracy any historical basis?
There have been different answers to such questions. Some say
that there is not an iota of democracy in China. Others want us to
believe that the only hope for Chinese democracy is found in the Com-
munist-controlled districts of Northern Shensi, and that a Communist
triumph will make China democratic.
The purpose of my paper is not to refute such statements which
need no refutation. My paper purports to describe a few historical
factors which have made China inevitably the first country in Asia to
abolish the monarchy once and for all and seriously to work out a
democratic form of government ; and which, in my opinion, furnish
the solid foundation on which a democratic China can be successfully
built up. These historical factors have been at work for tens of
centuries and have given to the Chinese people the tradition and the
preparation for the development of modern democratic institutions.
Of these historical foundations I shall mention only three: first,
a thoroughly democratized social structure; secondly, 2,000 years of an
objective and competitive system of examinations for civil service;
and thirdly, the historic institution of the government creating its own
"opposition" and censorial control.
You will notice I have singled out only the institutional foundations
and have not included the theoretical or philosophical basis for a demo-
cratic China. I believe that the best way of showing the influence of a
philosophical tradition is through the historic institutions which are
both the product and the embodiment of those intellectual forces.
But before taking up these historical institutions, I would like to say
a word about a few powerful philosophical ideas which have had a
great influence in molding the social and political development of the
Chinese people. The first of these is the Confucianist conception of
human nature as essentially good. In a rhymed primer which was
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I53l
written in the Sung Dynasty, and was still used in all village schools
during my childhood, the opening lines read:
In the beginning
Man's nature is good.
Near to one another by nature,
Men are set apart by practice.
Without teaching,
Nature degenerates.
These ideas which go back to Confucius, and particularly to Mencius,
have been the basis of Chinese education and have inculcated into the
people the sense of human equality. Confucius laid down the philos-
ophy in four words: "Yu chiao wu lei" (With education there is no
class). This conception of the essential goodness of human nature and
of the infinite possibility of education is the most important philo-
sophical idea which has produced an almost classless society in China.
Centuries before China came into contact with the democratic ideas of
Western countries, Chinese children in all village schools were hum-
ming such popular rhymes as the following:
Prime Ministers and Generals do not belong to any class:
Youths should exert themselves.
That is a popular paraphrase of the Confucian doctrine that with edu-
cation there is no class.
The second important democratic doctrine is the scriptural justifica-
tion of rebellion against tyrannical government. The story is told of
Confucius who passed by the foot of Mount Taishan and heard a
woman crying plaintively. He asked her what was the cause of her
deep sorrow. She said, "My father was carried away by a tiger: re-
cently my husband was killed by a tiger and now my son was devoured
by a tiger." "Why don't you run away from this place infested by such
ferocious tigers?" And the woman said, "There is no tyrannical gov-
ernment here." Confucius thereupon turned to his disciples and said,
"Remember this ! Tyrannical government is more oppressive than
ferocious tigers !"
Mencius in particular was the most outspoken advocate of the right
of rebellion against tyrannical government. He said, "When a ruler
treats his subject like grass and dirt, then the subject should treat him
as a bandit and an enemy." And he characterized some of the historical
rebellions, not as revolts of subjects against rulers, but as justified
revolutions against despots whose misrule had alienated them from the
people. This doctrine of justifiable rebellion against tyranny and
misrule was easily and naturally revived with the coming of revolu-
tionary and democratic ideas from the Western world.
The third important political doctrine is that the subordinate has a
sacred duty to criticize and oppose the wrong-doing of his superior. A
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little classic, "The Book of Filial Piety," has this saying of Confucius:
"If an Emperor has seven outspoken ministers [clieng ch'en: literally,
'ministers who fight or oppose him'], he could not lose his empire in
spite of his misdeeds. If a feudal lord has five outspoken ministers, he
could not lose his state in spite of his misdeeds. If a minister has three
outspoken servants, he could not lose his family fortune in spite of his
misdeeds Therefore, in the face of a wrong or unrighteousness
it is the duty of the son to oppose his father and it is the duty of the
servant to oppose his sovereign."
This idea of encouraging outspoken advice and even opposition
from one's subordinates has been a most important political tradition
which has made possible the development, not only of the institution
of the government's own censors, but also of the hundreds of great
personalities who made history by fighting fearlessly against the mis-
deeds of despotic rulers and powerful ministers.
It is from these basic seeds of Chinese political thinking that there
have been developed social and political institutions which have played,
and will continue to play, an important role in shaping the political
development of my people.
II
China was unified for the first time in 221 B.C. The First Empire
founded on military conquest of the contending states, did not last
more than a dozen years, and was overthrown by a revolution of the
people. The Second Empire, the Empire of Han, lasted 400 years
(202 B.c-219 a.d. ).
Even before the first unification under the First Empire, the
numerous small states which flourished at the time of Confucius were
gradually being absorbed and consolidated into seven great powers.
The old feudal society was rapidly disappearing in an age of conquest
migration of races, and political concentration. Practically all the seven
states of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. had highly centralized govern-
ment and administration. That tendency of centralized political con-
trol was made uniform under the First Empire, which divided the
whole country into thirty-six administrative districts or provinces
governed by officials appointed by the central government.
During the 400 years of the Han Empire, this tendency of political
consolidation was continued and perfected. In their first reaction
against the despotic consolidation of power under the First Empire,
the founders of the Han Dynasty created new feudal states and gave
them to the princes of the blood of the new royal family. But the
statesmen of the second century b.c. soon realized the mistake of this
political anachronism which had led to armed revolts by some of these
powerful princes against the central government. In order to avoid an
abrupt departure of policy, the political wisdom of these statesmen
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devised a peaceful method for abolishing the new feudalism. This new
procedure consisted of abolishing the law of primogeniture and of
dividing the hereditary fief equally among the sons of a deceased or
banished prince. After a few generations of equal division of feudal
estates among the male heirs, all the newly created principalities were
reduced to political nonentity and were peacefully subject to the civil
administration of the governors and prefects appointed by the central
imperial government. Feudalism has never been revived during the
last twenty-one centuries.
This tradition of equal division of hereditary property among the
sons of a family was adopted by all classes of people and has worked
for the equalization of wealth and landed property. Primogeniture
seemed to have been swept overboard with the disappearance of ancient
feudal society, and this new procedure came to be recognized as just
and equitable. Because of this, no great estate could stand three gen-
erations of successive equal division among the sons. The result has
been the total absence of large holdings of land by wealthy and power-
ful families for any great length of time. This economic equalization
has tended greatly to bring about a social structure in which there are
practically no class divisions and not even any enduring differences
between the rich and the poor.
The founders of the Han Empire came from the lowly strata of
society, including butchers, sellers of dog meat, undertakers, peddlers,
and farmers. Many of their women were of poor and lowly origin.
This was the first and probably the greatest dynasty and empire
founded by the people. That fact alone was an important asset in the
democratic tradition of China. The four hundred years of political
and social development under the Han Empire practically shaped and
conditioned the main lines of historical evolution of Chinese national
life and institutions throughout the later ages.
In addition to the institution of equal division of hereditary estates,
the Han statesmen were responsible for initiating as early as the second
century B.C. the system of selecting men for public office from among
those persons either recommended by public opinion of the localities
for their special achievements, or chosen through a competitive exam-
ination on their knowledge of the classical literature of ancient China.
Throughout the Empire men of poverty and lowly origin often arose
to highest positions of honor and power. One of the greatest generals,
who fought the Huns and drove them far beyond the Great Wall and
the desert, arose from slavery. And hundreds of cabinet ministers
came from families of destitution.
The earlier statesmen of the Empire consciously practiced the policy
of laissez-faire and strict economy in order to allow the people to re-
cuperate from the devastations of the terrible wars of the third century
and to grow accustomed to the peace and order of a unified Empire.
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It was a conscious effort to put into practice the political philosophy
of Wu wei (non-activity) taught by the school of philosophic Taoism.
Under this laissez-faire policy commerce and industry nourished and
the Empire prospered. There grew up a class of wealthy merchants
and "capitalists" who lived in comfort and luxury.
The new political leaders after 140 B.C. were largely Confucianist
scholars who were trained on books that exalted a static and essentially
agricultural society and who viewed with suspicion and disapproval the
rising commercial class, whom they considered as social parasites that
toiled not nor spun but lived on the sweat and blood of the toilers.
There were several serious attempts to limit the amount of land owned
by any single individual and to undertake governmental action for the
amelioration of the conditions of the poor. These reform movements
culminated in the socialistic policies of Wang Mang, who, in the
first years of the Christian Era, acquired political power and pro-
claimed himself Emperor of the New Dynasty which lasted sixteen
years (8-23 a.d.). Wang Mang nationalized all land, emancipated all
slaves, and instituted government regulations and monopolies of salt,
wine, coinage, credit, mining and natural resources. He was the first
"New Dealer."
Wang Mang's many socialistic reforms were swept away and he
was killed in the revolution which overthrew his dynasty and restored
the Han regime. But anti-mercantile, agrarian, and equalitarian
thought had become a part of orthodox social and political thinking of
Chinese intelligentsia and accounts for the low position which the
merchant occupies in the social scale. The conventional ranking of the
professions (not classes) into the scholar, the farmer, the artisan,
and the merchant is a product of this anti-mercantile tradition.
All these factors—the abolishing of primogeniture, the custom of
equal division of inherited property among the sons, the recognition
of the justice of people arising to power from lowliness, the selection
of men for office-holding by means of competitive examination, the
conscious curbing of the men of wealth—all these factors continued to
influence the social structure of China, making it more and more demo-
cratic. There was no aristocracy as a class except that of learning,
and learning was always accessible to all who had the intelligence and
the will to acquire it. The social structure was so thoroughly democ-
ratized and the process of leveling had gone so far that when the
Manchu Dynasty was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911-1912, no
one could think of a Chinese family sufficiently prominent to be quali-
fied as a possible candidate for the throne left vacant by the downfall
of an alien dynasty. Some thought of the family of Confucius ; but it
happened that at the time the direct lineal descendant of Confucius,
and the inheritor of the ducal title reserved to the Kung family, was
a little child hardlv one year old. So he was passed over, and even
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the so-called "constitutional monarchists" had to agree with the
republican revolutionaries that the monarchy must be abolished and
that a republic was the only thing feasible.
Ill
All important schools of Chinese thought of the classical period
agreed that government should be in the hands of the wisest and best-
informed people. They were unconsciously undermining the feudal
society by this advocacy of government by those best qualified to
govern. With the passing away of feudalism, and especially with the
establishment of a unified empire founded and governed by people who
arose from the masses, there was felt a great need for securing men of
knowledge and wisdom for the ordering of the state.
The founder of the Han Dynasty, who was an unlettered political
genius, once rebuked a scholar in these words: "I conquered the
Empire on horseback; what use have I for your classical books?"
The scholar retorted: "Sire, it is true you have conquered the Empire
on horseback ; but can you govern it on horseback ?" The early years
of the Second Empire witnessed the gradual rise of the scholarly class
who tamed the conquerors on horseback and helped them to write the
laws and institutes, to work out the details of administration, to remedy
the grotesque mistakes of the uncouth rulers, and to pacify and
stabilize the Empire.
The task of empire-building was truly tremendous. The Han
Empire in its great days was almost as large as the China of today.
Without modern means of transportation and communication, the work
of administering such a vast empire from a central government at
Chang-an, maintaining unity and peace for four hundred years, and
thereby setting up a permanent framework of a unified national life
for 2,000 years, was the greatest achievement of the political genius
of the Chinese people.
The civil service system originated in the realization of the need for
men who knew the language of the classical literature of ancient China.
The Empire was composed of vast areas which spoke different dialects,
and the only common medium of empire communication was the
classical language, which had been at one time a living dialect of
fairly wide currency in eastern and northern China, but had become
dead by the time of the second Empire. The first step was to establish
a government university with separate faculties or "doctoral colleges,"
each specializing in one of the ancient classics. But the revival of
learning through university education took time and the Empire needed
men for government offices. About the year 120 B.C., the Prime Min-
ister, Kung-Sun Hung, in a memorial to the throne, said that the
edicts and the laws which were written in elegant classical style were
often not understood even by the petty officers whose duty it was to
explain and interpret them to the people. Therefore, he recommended
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that examinations be held for the selection of men who could read
and understand the classical language and literature and that those
who had shown the best knowledge should have the first preference
in appointments to offices requiring the use of the written language.
His recommendation was adopted and marked the beginning of the
civil service examination system.
Throughout the four hundred years of the Han Empire, however,
there was not worked out any systematized procedure for the selection
of men for public offices. Broadly speaking, there were three methods
in use. In the first place, there were the examinations which had not
yet commanded much respect and were apparently limited to clerical
and secretarial offices. Secondly, there was the university, which in
the second century a.d. was said to have 30,000 students and was
becoming a political power much feared by the politicians. The uni-
versity education naturally gave the youths a fairly reliable chance of
civic advancement. Thirdly, from time to time the government would
ask the provincial authorities to recommend men of various kinds of
attainment. Men were recommended for their "filial piety and purity
of character" (hsiao lien), for "marked talent" (mou ts'ai), for
"specially distinguished attainments" (tso i), etc. Such recommenda-
tions were often, but not regularly, requested by the central govern-
ment, and those persons thus recommended were usually given offices.
Ts'ao Ts'ao (d. 219 a.d.), one of the greatest statesmen of the age,
worked out a system of classifying men into nine grades according to
their ability, knowledge, experience, and character. When his son
became Emperor in 220 a.d., this system of nine-grade classification
was officially adopted for the selection of men for government service.
Under this system, the government appointed a special official for each
administrative area, who was called "Chung Cheng" (the Impartial
Judge) and whose duty it was to list all possible candidates for office
and all men of good family, and, on the basis of public opinion and
personal knowledge, grade them into nine grades according to their
deserts. These gradings, which were to be revised periodically, were
to serve as the basis for appointment of these men to offices in the local,
provincial, or central government.
This system, known in history as that of "Nine-grade Impartial
Judgment," naturally involved much subjective opinion, family influ-
ence, and political pressure. It was humanly impossible to find an
objective standard for the nine degrees of grading. After being
tried out for fully four centuries, it was finally abolished under the
Sui Dynasty, which re-unified the country in 589, after a long period
of division, and instituted the Government Examination for civil
service in 606.
From the beginning of the seventh century to the beginning of the
twentieth century, for 1300 years, the main system of selection of men
for office was by open and competitive examination. Roughly speaking,
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this system has undergone three stages of evolution. The first period,
approximately from 600 to 1070, was the age of purely literary and
poetic examination. There were other subjects, such as history,
law, the Confucian classics and others, in which examinations were
regularly held. But somehow the purely literary examinations came
to be the only highly prized and universally coveted channel of entrance
into public life. The best minds of the country were attracted to this
class of examinations. The winners of the highest honors in these
poetic and literary examinations became idolized by the whole country
and especially by the women; and the successful candidates in these
literary examinations usually attained the heights of governmental
power more rapidly than those who took the other more prosaic
examinations. In the eyes of the nation only these literary and poetic
examinations commanded the interest and the admiration of the peo-
ple, and the other examinations seemed not to count at all.
The reasons for this peculiar pre-eminence of the literary and
poetic examinations are not far to seek. While the other examinations
required book knowledge and memory work, this class of ching shih
(advanced scholars) was expected to offer creative poetic composition.
The difficult themes assigned and the strict rules prescribed only made
the successful winners shine more glamorously. And it is not true that
poets are always born and not made. Fashion and training can always
make a poet of some sort out of a man of native intelligence. Besides,
these original compositions required wide reading, wealth of knowl-
edge, and independence of judgment. For these reasons the ching
shih came practically to monopolize the civil service for almost four
centuries, and great statesmen and empire builders came out of a sys-
tem which, though fair, seemed completely devoid of practical training.
The second period of the civil service system may be called an age
of transition. The purely literary examination had been severely
criticized on the ground of its failure to encourage the youths of the
nation to prepare themselves in the practical and useful knowledge
of morals and government. In the year 1071, the reformer-statesman
Wang An-shih succeeded in persuading his Emperor to adopt and
proclaim a new system of examinations, in which the poetic compo-
sitions were entirely abolished and the scholars were required to
specialize in one of the major classics as well as to master the minor
classics. Under the new system the scholars were also asked to write
an essay on some historic subject and to answer in detail three ques-
tions of current and practical importance. This new system was
naturally severely attacked by the sponsors of the old poetic examina-
tions. For two hundred years the government wavered between the two
policies. The prose classical examination was several times discarded
and again re-established. Finally the government compromised by offer-
ing a dual system placing the poetic composition and the prose classical
exposition as two alternate systems for the candidates to choose.
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Then came the third period during which the prose classical exami-
nation finally became the only legitimate form of civil service exam-
ination. The Mongol conquest of North China, and later of the whole
of China, had brought about much interruption and dislocation of
Chinese political life, including the abolition of the civil service exam-
ination system for many decades. When the civil service examinations
were revived in 13 14, the classical scholars had their way in tri-
umphantly working out an examination system entirely centering
around the Confucian classics. In order to make it more attractive to
the creative minds, a special form of prose composition was gradually
evolved which, though not rhymed, was highly rhythmic, often running
in balanced sentences, and so rich in cadence that it could be often sing-
songed aloud. All candidates were also required to write a poem on an
assigned theme as a supplement to every examination paper. These
new developments seemed to have satisfied both the desire for original
poetic expression and the more utilitarian demand for a mastery of
the Confucian classics which were supposed to be the foundation of the
moral and political life of the Chinese nation. So this new examina-
tion system lasted from 13 14 to 1905 with comparatively few radical
changes in the general scheme.
In a broad sense, therefore, the statesmen of China have seriously
attempted to work out and put into practice a system of civil service
examination open to all people, irrespective of family, wealth, religion,
or race. The subject-matter of the examinations, whether it be orig-
inal poetic composition or rhythmic prose exposition of the classics,
has been severely and probably justly criticized, as useless literary
gymnastics. But the main idea behind these examinations is a desire
to work out some objective and impartial standard for the selection of
men for public offices. The sincerity of that desire was attested
throughout history by the development and improvement of the safe-
guards against favoritism and fraud in the examinations. One of the
safe-guards was the method of sealing the name of the examinee
so that no name should appear on the examination paper. Another
safe-guard was to have every examination paper copied by the gov-
ernment copyists and to submit to the examiners only the copy and not
the original, so that the examiner could not recognize the hand-writ-
ing of his own students, friends, or relatives. These techniques were
invented about the year 1000 and have been in use in all the later
centuries. Fraud in the examinations was punished by the heaviest
penalties.
Indeed, the system was so objective and fair that scholars who re-
peatedly failed to pass the examinations rarely complained of the in-
justice of the system itself but often comforted themselves with the
proverb, "In the examination hall literary merit does not always count,"
meaning that luck may be against you. As the subject-matter was
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always taken from the few classics and in later centuries always from
the "Four Books" for the lower examinations, it was possible for the
poorest family to give a talented child the necessary education which
cost practically nothing in books or in tuition. In the popular theatres,
one often sees well-known plays portraying a poor young man or a poor
son-in-law of a beggar-chief successfully taking high honors in the ex-
aminations. It was a just system which enabled the sons of the poorest
and lowliest families to rise through a regular process of competition to
the highest positions of honor and power in the Empire.
Throughout the centuries of training under this system, there has
grown up a deep-rooted tradition in the minds of the Chinese people
that government should be in the hands of those who are best fitted
to govern ; and that officers and officials of the state are not born of
any special class but should be selected through some system of com-
petitive examination open to all who are prepared to take it.
IV
The office of the Imperial Censor, or literally the "Imperial Histo-
rian," probably derived its extraordinary censorial authority from the
very ancient days when the historian was a religious priest and repre-
sented the will of the gods. At the time of Confucius stories were
told of historians who defied despotic rulers and powerful prime min-
isters in insisting upon telling and recording the truth as they saw it.
They preferred death to changing their recordings. Confucius himself
tried to write a kind of history where every word would imply a moral
judgment of approval or disapproval, so that rulers and leaders of
states might be encouraged to do good and refrain from evil-doing
by their natural regard for the judgment of posterity.
In later ages the historians rarely kept up this rigoristic tradition of
truth-telling, but there grew up a new tradition of out-spoken advice
and admonition on the part of the Imperial Censors. The duty of
out-spoken interrogation and censure of the misdeeds of all govern-
ment officials from the highest to the lowest was not confined to the
Imperial Censors alone or to any particular censorial office. It was in
fact a right and a moral duty of all officials of rank to speak freely and
frankly to the Imperial Government on all matters concerning the
misery and suffering of the people, or astrological signs or warnings
pointing to bad government in any particular direction, or policies
which should be promoted or abolished. In short, Chinese moral and
political tradition required of every government official this sacred duty
of serving as the out-spoken adviser of his sovereign.
All political thinking of ancient China taught the importance of
out-spoken censure as the only means for the ruler to know his own
faults, the disastrous policies of his government, and the grievances of
the people. An ancient statesman of the eighth century B.C. is recorded
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to have said: "To stop the voice of the people is more dangerous than
to dam the flow of a river. The wise manager of the river deepens
its basin and facilitates its flow. The wise ruler of men encourages
them to speak up freely." Free expression and out-spoken opposition
are. therefore, safety-valves through which the complaints, protests,
and grievances of the people are expressed and heard. They are also
mirrors in which the rulers can see their own shortcomings. It is,
therefore, the duty of the ruler to tolerate all forms of out-spoken
advice and opposition, however offensive they may be.
Throughout the long history of China, there are numberless cases of
statesmen who incurred the displeasure of their rulers by courageously
opposing what they considered as ruinous policies of the government.
Not a few of these out-spoken advisers were put to death or subjected
to bodily torture. But, in general, even the most notorious despots
usually had an almost religious regard for the tradition which exalted
tolerance of frank censure as one of the highest virtues of the ruler.
With the exception of the few dark periods of the Ming Dynasty,
most of the dynasties treated the out-spoken censors with tolerance
and leniency. Some of the great rulers, such as the second Emperor
of the Tang Dynasty, were famous for their eagerness to seek frank
advice from their ministers. The intimate memorials to the throne by
such famous statesmen as Wei Cheng of the seventh century and Lu
Chih of the eighth century read like heart-to-heart advice of one faith-
ful friend to another. They cover all kinds of topics from private con-
duct to military campaigns of great importance. Such works have been
an inspiration to statesmen throughout the ages.
Even in those periods when out-spoken censors were punished
brutally by the despotic rulers, those martyrs in the cause of free politi-
cal criticism were usually vindicated, sometimes after a few years and
sometimes after one or two generations. In such cases the vindication
came in the form of conferring posthumous honors on the martyred
censors, some of whom were given seats in the Temple of Confucius.
The policies they had sponsored were now adopted and the persons
against whom they had fought were now disgraced. As a philosopher
of the seventeenth century put it: "There are only two things that are
supreme in this world: one is reason, the other, authority. Of the two,
reason is the more supreme. For in the history of the struggle of the
righteous statesmen against the powerful prime ministers and eu-
nuchs, reason always triumphed over authority in the end." This best
expresses the spirit of the Chinese censors: they represented the
Chinese historic struggle for liberty.
In a sense, the censorial system may be called the Chinese counter-
part for a parliament. Indeed, the censors were called "The Officials
Who Speak" (yen kwan), which is an etymological reminder of the
modern democratic parliaments. The Censorial Office, or Tribunal, was
not a law-making organ but undertook almost every other political
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and semi-judicial function of a modern parliament, including interro-
gation, impeachment of government officials, passing on the accounts
of the governmental departments, and receiving complaints and griev-
ances of the people. Tradition gave it the right "to speak out even
on hearsay." There was naturally the danger of malicious libel and
political attack without sufficient evidence. But the main idea was to
encourage free speech and to initiate investigation in cases where
evidence could not be easily obtained without the effort of special
investigators.
As I have pointed out, the right and duty to advise the govern-
ment were not confined to the censors alone. All central and provincial
officials above a certain rank had the right and the duty to petition the
throne on all matters affecting the policy of the government or the
interest of the people. In the light of history, much of the advice
offered was ridiculous, and many of the issues bitterly fought were
trivial. But this tradition of encouragement to out-spoken opposition
has, on the whole, played an important and beneficial part in the mold-
ing of Chinese political life. It has not only trained the nation to
regard out-spoken and fighting officials as national heroes and protec-
tors of the interests of the people, but it has also taught the people to
think that government needs censorial check and control and that out-
spoken opposition to the misdeeds of government officials and even of
emperors and empresses is a necessary part of a political constitution.
These three historical factors—a democraticized and classless social
structure, a traditional belief in the selection of office-holders through
an objective competitive examination, and a long history of encourage-
ment of out-spoken censorial control of the government—these are the
heritages of my people from the political development throughout the
long centuries. They are the historical factors which alone can ex-
plain the Chinese Revolution, the overthrow of the monarchy, the estab-
lishment of a republican form of government, and the constitutional
development of the last thirty years and of the years to come.
The best evidence of the great importance of these historical herit-
ages is the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Revo-
lution and of the Republic, deliberately adopted the power of exami-
nation for civil service and the power of censorial control of the
government as two of the five divisions of governmental power, the
other three being the traditional executive, legislative, and judicial
powers. In these three decades of revolutionary wars and foreign
invasion, China has not yet worked out a permanent constitution. But
it is safe to predict that the future constitution of China will be a
workable democratic constitution made possible by these historical
factors without which no importation or imitation of foreign political
institutions can function and take root.
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